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Sammendrag 
Kina har opplevd en imponerende økonomisk vekst siden landet åpnet seg for utenlandske 
investeringer og ble med i Verdens Handelsorganisasjon.  I 2013 lanserte den kinesiske 
presidenten Xi Jinping sitt «Belt and Road Initiative». Initiativet har utviklet seg til å bli et 
flaggskip i Kinas forhold til resten av verden. Det er Kinas gradvise åpningen mot verden, 
også på energifeltet, som ligger til grunn for oppgaven. 
Oppgaven er en kvalitativ case-studie om Yamal LNG Prosjektet som er lokalisert på Yamal-
halvøya i det russiske Arktis. Prosjektet har en stor kinesisk eierandel, sammen med russiske 
og franske selskaper. Oppgaven kombinerer data fra offentlige kinesiske utviklingsplaner, 
investorene i prosjektet, og fra intervjuer med kinesiske eksperter. 
Ved å investere i energiprosjekter som Yamal LNG ønsker Kina å oppnå en rekke mål. 
Oppgaven drøfter tre av disse og samspillet mellom dem. Hvordan kan deltakelse i prosjektet 
sikre Kinas energisikkerhet, geopolitiske stilling og økonomiske utvikling?  Av disse legger 
jeg mest vekt på drøftingen av energisikkerhet som et overordnet mål for landet 
Energisikkerhet-begrepet er bygd opp rundt fire dimensjoner: fysisk og økonomisk 
tilgjengelighet, pålitelighet og bærekraftighet. Oppgaven drøfter hver av disse både 
konseptuelt og med referanse til Yamal LNG investeringene. Et av de mest interessante 
funnene i denne oppgaven er hvordan bærekraftighet som er et relativt nytt tilskudd til 
diskusjonen rundt energisikkerhet har blitt vektlagt så tungt av kinesiske myndigheter. 
Hovedkonklusjonen i min oppgave er at Yamal LNG prosjektet gir et viktig bidrag til Kinas 
energisikkerhet. 
Oppgaven identifiserer også tre kinesiske geopolitiske mål; å forbedre forholdet til 
nabolandene, motvirke den amerikanske satsingen i Asia, og å forbedre 
transportinfrastrukturen på land, og dermed redusere avhengigheten av maritime 
transportveier. De kinesiske investeringene i Yamal LNG Prosjektet er delvis i stand til å 
hjelpe Kina nå disse målene. 
De kinesiske investeringene i Yamal LNG Prosjektet hjelper Kina å oppnå en rekke 
økonomiske målsettinger. De økonomiske driverne som jeg har identifiser i denne oppgaven 
er; å flytte reserver av utenlandsk valuta til mer profitable investeringer, redusere 
overkapasitet i den kinesiske økonomien, tilrettelegge for handel, samt utvikle kinesisk 
teknologi.  
ii 
De kinesiske investeringene i Yamal LNG Prosjektet bidrar også å endre verdens 
transportruter for energi ved å bidra til å åpne nord-øst passasjen, noe som er i Kinas 
interesse. 
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Abstract 
China has experienced impressive economic growth since opening itself up to foreign 
investment and joining the World Trade Organization. In 2013, the Chinese President Xi 
Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative is enormous in scale and scope 
and has become one of the most important Chinese foreign policies. This strengthened outward 
focus of the Chinese government is the starting point of this thesis. 
The thesis employs a qualitative case study methodology of central Chinese policy papers as 
well as critical analysis of interviews with Chinese experts. The central case for the thesis is the 
Yamal LNG Project located on the Yamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic. 
There are several strategic Chinese objectives driving the investment decisions behind projects 
such as the Yamal LNG project. The thesis identifies these drivers, and studies the interplay 
between them. How may participation in the project strengthen China’s energy security, 
geopolitical situation and economic development? Out of these drivers, I emphasise the 
discussions of Chinese energy security the most, as energy security is identified as an overriding 
national goal. 
Energy security was divided into four distinct constituent parts, namely: availability, 
affordability, reliability and sustainability. The Yamal LNG project seems to hold the potential 
to improve the energy security situation of China. One of the most interesting findings in this 
thesis was how sustainability, which is a late addition to the energy security discourse, is given 
such a strong emphasis by the Chinese government. My main conclusion in this thesis is that 
the Yamal LNG Project investments provide an important contribution to the energy security 
of China. 
I identified three distinct Chinese geopolitical objectives, namely to; improve the relations with 
neighbouring countries, counter the US pivot to Asia, and to improve connectivity on land and 
thus reduce dependency on sea lanes. The Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG Project are 
in the opinion of this thesis partly able to help achieve these goals. 
The Yamal LNG Project also helps the Chinese government achieve most of its economic goals. 
The economic investment drivers identified in this thesis are to move foreign currency to more 
profitable investments, reduce overcapacity, facilitate the ease of trade, and to develop Chinese 
technology. 
v 
The Chinese Yamal LNG investments will also alter international flows of energy, open new 
routes of transportation, and help improve the international relations between China and other 
nations. The thesis finds the Chinese Yamal LNG investments to be a good fit for fulfilling 
Chinese strategic policies and development goals. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement: 
For China to go into the Yamal LNG project may at first glance appear as simply a move to 
secure direct foreign investments abroad. In this thesis, I claim that understanding the Chinese 
involvement in Yamal LNG should be understood in a multi-faceted way, and that there may 
be many drivers, energy security being one of them. I argue that strengthening Chinese energy 
security is a desired goal, and I try to investigate the importance of this driver in the interplay 
with other drivers. 
In the speech of the Chinese President Xi Jinping to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in October 2017, both challenges and possibilities for the future of 
China are being outlined. In this speech, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) is being presented 
as a major part of the solution to these challenges (Xi, 2017).  
Along the lines of the BRI, investment projects are being initiated. The two main lines of the 
BRI is the Economic Belt going through the Eurasian continent towards Europe, and the 
Maritime Silk Road going along the sea route from Asia, past Africa, and further to Europe. 
The aim of these projects is to develop hard and soft infrastructure to facilitate trade, 
transportation and cooperation. Several frameworks and institutions have been developed as 
funding vehicles to achieve the goals of these initiatives. Among them is the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund (SRF) and continued official 
encouragement for Chinese companies to go abroad. 
China has recently launched its first white paper on its Arctic Policy, and it is clear that the 
Arctic is an area of interest to China and Chinese development. With the recent decision of 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the Chinese Silk Road Fund (SRF) to invest 
heavily in the Yamal LNG project, new possibilities of Arctic development may present 
themselves.  
In this thesis, I will examine the documents of the BRI, the Chinese Energy Policy, the Arctic 
Policy of China, as well as interview researchers on these fields of expertise to provide an 
overview of the drivers that may be behind the decision of Chinese investment in the Yamal 
LNG Project. After this I will try to investigate the importance of energy security in the 
interplay between a mix of these drivers.  
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Problem Statement: 
How does energy security concerns play a role in Chinese investment decisions in the 
Arctic Yamal LNG project? 
This problem statement will require me to collect information on the Belt and Road Initiative 
of China, its Arctic Policy and its energy situation. Since I claim that the development goals of 
China are diverse, I will look at the project investments from different perspectives. Energy 
security and perspectives within geopolitics are applied theories in my analysis. 
1.2 Actualization 
In 2013, China launched the Belt and Road initiative, which has become one of its most 
important foreign policies. The initiative encompasses many countries and enjoys the full 
economic and political backing of the Chinese state. The message from the Chinese government 
has been one of inclusiveness, openness, cooperation, and joint development. The project has 
been well received by most countries, some others however see the initiative as a threat. This 
can be seen by the following quotes: 
“With few exceptions, however, these projects have been advertised by Beijing and recipient 
countries as economic opportunities.” (Funaiole and Hillman, 2018: 2). The authors continue 
to say that “within this broad and ever-expanding construct, Chinese investments have been 
especially active in the Indo-Pacific region, raising questions about whether it is China’s 
economic or strategic interests that are driving major port investments” (Funaiole and Hillman, 
2018: 2). 
There has also recently been a growing concern among recipient countries regarding the heavy 
debt burden from received investment projects. As a stark example, according to a news article 
by the New York Times, Sri Lanka handed in 2017 its newly constructed Hambantota Port to 
China. Sri Lanka lost the control over its port for 99 years because it has defaulted on its debt 
to China. Thus, it has been argued that BRI projects may constitute debt traps for capital poor 
recipient countries (Abi-Habib, 2018). Following this, the government of Myanmar decided to 
scale down on its own Chinese-financed Kyaukpyu port construction. The project is a part of 
the Belt and Road Initiative, and a way for China to diversify Chinese energy supply routes 
(The Guardian, 2018). Despite such problems, it is certain that the initiative with time will 
influence the countries involved, and the world as a whole. 
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China has a vast economy and is as of today the largest consumer of energy in the world. Much 
of the energy consumed is imported, and due to domestic reasons, this external dependency on 
energy and resource sourcing is expected to increase.  
As a central topic in this master thesis, we will see how China has looked to the north and 
invested in the Yamal LNG project in the Russian Arctic. The Yamal LNG Project is a major 
LNG project situated in the Russian Arctic on the Yamal Peninsula. With the latest 
developments between Russia and the West, relations are running cold, and the sanctions 
imposed on Russia largely forbid western companies wanting to invest in the Russian energy 
sector. In a search for investment, lending and new energy markets, Russia has worked to turn 
east, and to improve relations with China. Some academics have indicated a lack of studies 
covering the energy relations between China and Russia in the Arctic. 
On this note, Bertelsen and Gallucci (2016: 243) say that “In North Atlantic and Nordic Arctic 
research, there has been little attention to Sino-Russian relations concerning energy and raw 
materials in the enormous Russian Arctic or the Bering end of trans-Arctic shipping routes, 
which involves the USA, Japan, and South Korea”. This view is partly reflected by in an article 
by Weidacher Hsiung (2016) where he argued that “...China’s Arctic oil and gas interests 
remain understudied, especially as regards actual activities” (Widacher Hsiung, 2016: 244).  
In this thesis, I have attempted to analyse the drivers behind the investment decision widely. 
Bertelsen and Gallucci (2016: 240) continue to say that “The Arctic has received new outside 
attention for about a decade. Much of this attention – especially popular, but also academic – 
has focused on local factors in the Arctic. The focus has often been on energy, minerals and 
shipping lanes made accessible by climate change. There has been a lack of attention to the 
wider forces of globalization driving this attention to the Arctic”. Therefore, the political 
drivers and international dynamics will be attempted implemented in this analysis of the 
Chinese Yamal LNG Project investments.  
1.3 Motivation 
During my studies at Nord University and at Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 
I have been presented with a range of topics covering the energy business, geopolitics, Arctic 
governance, as well as business development. In my opinion, these questions will only intensify 
in importance in the years to come. 
At the end of my semester in Moscow, we were presented with the opportunity to write our 
master thesis at East China Normal University, Shanghai, China. Because of this, I began to 
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look at Chinese involvement in Arctic questions, and I was certain that I had found a topic of 
utmost relevance. 
As a self-proclaimed Near-Arctic State, China has a long history of interests in the Arctic and 
is now launching BRI as a large-scale strategy of development. These developments are in my 
opinion capable of changing international dynamics, relations, and development patterns in the 
years to come. We all ought to see future possibilities, as well as the challenges emerging on 
the horizon. I hope that my review of the literature on the topic, a collection of data and a 
thorough examination of the Yamal LNG case will serve this purpose and contribute to our 
common knowledge.  
1.4 The structure of my thesis 
My thesis is structured in the following way: 
Chapter 2 is my methodology chapter. This chapter covers the treatment of data and discussions 
of my thesis. In this chapter, I cover the data sources, data collection, data treatment, validity 
and reliability of my data, as well as the weaknesses of my research. 
Chapter 3 explains the background information relevant to the discussions later in the thesis. 
The energy situation of China is the starting point, then the Belt and Road Initiative, The Arctic 
Policy of China, the Sino-Russian relations, Sino-Norwegian relations will be covered.  
Chapter 4 is the chapter describing the Yamal LNG Project, the central case of this thesis. In 
this chapter, I explain the historical background, the ownership structure, capital providers, and 
the economic justification for the project. 
Chapter 5 is the chapter explaining the theoretical framework for my thesis. I have selected the 
theories and perspectives that will help answer the problem. In my thesis, these are theories of 
energy security and of the geopolitics of oil and gas. 
Chapter 6 and 7 will be my main discussions chapters. In chapter 6, I try to assess the Yamal 
LNG Projects’ fit with core Chinese strategic goals. In chapter 7, I comment on the 
consequences of the Chinese Yamal LNG Project investments on the Sino-Russian and Sino-
Norwegian relations and the consequences for international flows of energy.  
In chapter 8, I try to provide some concluding remarks on the drivers behind the investments. 
In addition, chapter 8 is the chapter in which I revisit the findings of my thesis. 
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2.0 Methodology 
I will in this chapter explain and justify the methodological choices regarding research design, 
data collection, interview guide, data analysis, validity and reliability as well as ethical 
considerations of the research. In the last section, the perceived weaknesses of the research are 
being described. Some of my methodological choices and, especially when it comes to data 
gathering and interviews, spring from the fact that I did fieldwork at the East China Normal 
University in Shanghai. As an example, being in China gave me valuable access to two Chinese 
scholars for interviews. 
2.1 Research Design 
I have decided that a case study design would be the best fit for my thesis. A case study design 
is according to the well-known authority on case studies Robert K. Yin the “preferred strategy 
when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” 
(Yin, 1994: 1). The research problem “How does energy security concerns play a role in 
Chinese investment decisions in the Arctic Yamal LNG project?” is formulated in exactly this 
way, begging a deep understanding of underlying drivers and forces. The approach of my 
research is hence within the appropriate scope of a case study design. 
Following this line of thought, Yin said that “a case study is and empirical inquiry that a) 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when b) the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994: 13). Yin 
adds that this contrasts with an experiment, where the phenomenon is supposed to be isolated 
from its natural context. Furthermore, in reference to the quote above, a case study method 
should be chosen deliberately when you think that the context is important to understand the 
phenomenon. In writing this thesis, I have tried to thoroughly describe the Yamal LNG project, 
collected public data on the Yamal LNG project as my case and tried to understand as many 
aspects of the drivers behind the Chinese investments as I could. While doing this, I wanted to 
understand the Yamal LNG project and the Chinese goals in relation to their context. 
A case study design may include one or more units of analysis, as well as one or more cases 
(Yin, 1994). In this thesis, I have chosen the Yamal LNG project as my case. I have also 
collected data from multiple sources and interviewed academic experts on the issues. All these 
sources of data are my units of analysis. My thesis is hence built as a single-case case study 
with multiple units of analysis. 
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2.2 Data collection 
A case study may according to Yin (1994) be conducted using both quantitative or qualitative 
data. This thesis is built on qualitative data collection.  
Qualitative research methods attempt to discover what people think and feel about a 
phenomenon, and what motives lie behind their actions. Said in a different way: “the qualitative 
interview is particularly well suited for accessing the experiences, thoughts and feelings of an 
informant” (Translated from Dalen, 2011: 13). Another characteristic of qualitative research is 
furthermore that the selection of respondents is smaller and that the qualitative methods provide 
a ‘softer’ dataset than quantitative methods do. The collected data are in the form of text or 
sound and can thus not be directly inserted into an analytical program. 
This assignment aims to understand the drivers and mechanisms behind the actions of 
companies and nation-states in relation to the Yamal LNG project. In other words, I will have 
to explore how these actors experience the world. Since the goal of the research is to discover 
the underlying motivations rather than quantifying the extent of a phenomenon, qualitative data 
will be suitable for my thesis. 
Options for data collection. Despite being in China, it has been very hard to interview 
authoritative sources for my thesis. On the other side, extensive strategy and policy documents 
have been published from the central Chinese government. The documents used are the speech 
of Chinese President Xi Jinping to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 
China’s Energy Policy, China’s Arctic Policy, and the Belt and Road policy documents. They 
have been freely available, and highly valuable for my thesis. In addition, being in China gave 
me access to two knowledgeable academics1, and interviews with these combined with peer-
reviewed research papers will form the second addition to my discussions. 
2.3 Interview guide 
For this thesis, I chose to prepare a semi-structures interview guide (Johannessen, 
Christoffersen and Tufte, 2011: 145). I had ideas about the topics that would be the most 
interesting to my thesis. I also wanted to remember to cover all of the points during the 
interview. I, therefore, outlined a set of questions that I would attempt to cover, but other than 
that I allowed the interviewee to explain freely. The semi-structured interview format allowed 
                                                 
1 I have chosen to keep the identity of the two Chinese academics I interviewed secret and just denote their 
names as Professor L and Professor S. Their names have been shared with my supervisor who has confirmed the 
bona fide status of the two interviewees as reputable experts in their respective fields. 
7 
me to retain some level of control over the topics, but also allowed me the freedom to pursue 
any interesting remarks.  
2.4 Data analysis 
The data of my thesis has been analysed by following the traditions of meaning condensation. 
Meaning condensation is a method to simplify the processing of long and complex texts and 
interviews (Kvale et al., 2015). The authors continue by clarifying that meaning condensation 
involves a condensation/shortening of the data material into shorter formulations. 
During the interviews, I used electronic recording equipment. This was to be able to reproduce 
the data from the interview accurately and in an unbiased way. After this, I went through the 
same procedure as with the written documents. I listened through the interview once and 
subsequently wrote a short and concise version of the interview. The short versions of the 
interviews are also presented in the appendix at the end of this thesis. Direct quotes from these 
interviews are provided in my analysis to support my interpretations of what was said.  
2.5 Validity and reliability 
To strengthen the quality of the research undertaken, it is important to consciously keep validity 
and reliability in mind. This sub-chapter is inspired by the validity and reliability discussions 
made by Sandberg (2000). The criteria used are communicative validity, pragmatic validity, 
and reliability as interpretive awareness. 
Communicative validity is based on a common understanding. Sandberg sites Kvale, and says 
that: “Establishing communicative validity involves an ongoing dialogue in which alternative 
knowledge claims are debated throughout the research process” (Kvale 1989, from Sandberg, 
2000: 14). For this thesis: 
I attempted to build a common platform of mutual understanding. I presented myself and the 
project before we met and before the interviews begun. When pieces of the background 
information were unclear or unknown to the informant, I attempted to explain the unclear parts 
more thoroughly, and seek a common understanding on the matter.  
I used only a few but relatively wide and open questions to encourage the interviewee to explain 
what he felt was important.  
I was constantly provided follow-up questions when parts of the answers were unclear, or if I 
felt the assignment could benefit from even more information on the issue. These questions 
were important in order to avoid misunderstandings and to achieve clarity during the interviews. 
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Pragmatic validity “involves testing the knowledge produced in action” (Kvale, 1989, from 
Sandberg, 2000: 14). Pragmatic validity aims to find out whether what is being said actually 
takes place in the real world. To establish pragmatic validity, I did as Sandberg (2000): 
Firstly, I asked follow-up questions requesting practical examples of what was being said. 
While reading the published Chinese documents I also attempted to simultaneously look at 
examples where what was being written also took place. Such an approach allowed me to read 
and perform interviews critically.  
Secondly, I rephrased what the interviewees said and presented my interpretations back to the 
informants. I then asked for their opinions on my interpretations. If the feedback was negative 
or they appeared disagree with my interpretation, I asked the informants to correct my 
misunderstandings. During my interviews, misunderstandings occasionally happened. These 
misunderstandings were subsequently corrected as a part of the conversation. 
Reliability as interpretative awareness “means acknowledging that re- searchers cannot escape 
from their interpretations but must explicitly deal with them throughout the research process” 
Sandberg (2000: 14). To do this, I: 
Primarily asked questions posed with what and how to encourage the interviewees to explain 
what the topic of discussion means to them.  
At the beginning, I tried to treat all statements as equally interesting. This was also done while 
reading the official documents from Chinese authorities. All sections relating to my topic were 
read thoroughly and treated as equally important initially. This was done in order not to miss 
out on important details during my analysis.  
I asked follow-up questions to encourage the informant to more thoroughly express what they 
meant by their statements. 
I worked to improve the validity and reliability of my research by adopting a conscious 
approach to these questions, and to undertake concrete actions. By following the actions of 
Sandberg (2000), I aimed to achieve two types of validity and one type of reliability. 
2.6 Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations of the research conducted should be considered to avoid any 
wrongdoings. According to Johannessen, Christoffersen and Tufte (2011: 93: translated) 
“Ethics are about principles, rules, and guidelines for evaluations of whether actions are right 
or wrong. Such rules and guidelines are naturally valid for scientific research as for all other 
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activities in society” For me, it is important that the research conducted is done in an ethically 
correct way. A series of recommendations for ethically correct conduct is described by 
Johannessen, Christoffersen and Tufte (2011). In doing my research I followed the relevant 
recommendations, and in this sub-chapter, I will present the measures I have undertaken to help 
mitigate ethical problems. 
I presented the informants with information about the study before the interviews so that they 
were comfortable with the purpose of my research and what we would cover during the 
interview. 
I asked for permission for recording the conversation electronically. This way no recordings 
were done without the explicit consent of the interviewees. 
I informed the informants about their independence and right to stop the interview. I did this by 
telling the interviewees that they could stop the interview at any time and pull their statements 
at any time without any objections. 
2.7 Methodological limitations 
There are a couple of challenges and weaknesses facing this research. First, it is hard to directly 
access and interview official Chinese policymakers. My analysis, therefore, must rely on 
officially published and openly available information, as well as academic commentaries and 
newspaper articles. 
Secondly, to create a holistic and comprehensive analysis of energy drivers within the China’s 
Arctic Policy and the Yamal LNG Project, I found it necessary to include a range of other 
dimensions of Chinese policy. In my opinion, no analysis of energy questions would be 
complete without discussing the various competing drivers. Nevertheless, including them all 
may make the thesis seem unfocused in its scope. To tackle this, I attempted to make a 
compromise between focus and completeness, but depending on the reader, my thesis may still 
be open for criticism in this aspect.  
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3.0 The backdrop 
This chapter will provide necessary background material for answering the research question 
presented in part 1.1 above. It consists of the following sub-sections; the Chinese energy 
situation; the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); China’s Arctic Policy and; Sino-Russian and Sino-
Norwegian relations.  
3.1 The Chinese energy situation 
- Understanding the Chinese energy situation is important for understanding the Chinese 
view on its energy policies. 
- China is increasingly concerned with the harmful environmental impact of coal 
consumption and is looking for substituting domestically produced coal with natural 
gas, both domestic and imported. 
- Sourcing energy externally makes China dependent on foreign partners and long 
transportation routes. China is therefore concerned about its energy security. 
China is today the largest consumer of energy in the world (BP Energy Outlook 2018 Edition, 
2018: 57) It is also a net importer of both oil and gas and will depend on sourcing these 
commodities from around the world. The continued sourcing of energy and raw materials is 
important for the continued economic growth of China. 
In the energy strategy of (IOSCPRC, 2012), it is stated that China is experiencing a grave 
challenge to its energy security. As the economy of China grows, and the domestic resources 
of China are produced, the degree on import dependency on energy resources is increasing. As 
an example, petroleum import dependency has increased from 32% in the early 2000s to 57% 
in 2012 (IOSCPRC, 2012). 
As we can see from the following illustration, China is highly dependent on the Middle East 
for its petroleum supply. The following chart shows the world oil transportation by sea. The 
estimates in this chart are in million barrels per day and include other petroleum products than 
crude oil as well.   
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All estimates in million barrels per day. Includes crude oil and petroleum products. Based on 2013 data. 
Illustration 3.1: Daily transit volumes through world marine chokepoints per 2013 Source: Metelitsa and Mercer 
(2014). 
Petroleum from the Middle East must pass through both Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of 
Malacca. In the Energy Strategy of China, it is written that “marine transportation of petroleum 
and cross-border pipeline transmission of oil and gas face ever-greater security risks” 
(IOSCPRC, 2012: Part I). This implies that China is growing concerned over its dependency 
on foreign supply of energy. 
According to the strategy, it is especially important to work to ensure stability in the Middle 
East. The energy strategy of China claims that the stability of oil producing and exporting 
countries is a responsibility of the international community and should be ensured through 
dialogue and consultation. Trade routes should according to China be guarded against 
disruptions. Military means, geopolitical conflicts and politicizing energy issues should be 
avoided if possible (IOSCPRC, 2012: Part IX). 
Not only petroleum but also gas is sourced across the oceans, as seen in the following chart: 
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Illustration 3.2: Would LNG trade of 2015 Source: IEC modelling (found in The Castlegar Source (2015)). 
The gas sourced from the Middle East will be facing the same challenges as other petroleum 
products from the region. The South-Eastern Asian market is as we can see in the illustration 
above also dependent on Australia for its LNG. Australia is traditionally a US ally and may be 
holding some interests unaligned with Chinese interests. As an example of the latter, in early 
2018 Australian warships navigated in the South China Sea, causing an encounter with the 
Chinese Navy (Wen and Sonali, 2018).  
There has been growing unrest in Australia due to Chinese investments in Australian assets 
(Smyth, 2018). In addition, there is some level of distrust between Australia and China with 
regards to national security, as indicated by the recent Australian ban on both Huawei and ZTE 
on installing of 5G equipment in Australia (Kharpal, 2018).  
Price fluctuations on the international markets are also mentioned as challenges to the domestic 
supply of energy. When prices change, so does the degree of the affordability dimension of 
energy security, which we will discuss on a later point.  
The energy strategy of China from 2012 calls on China to “...continuously improve its energy 
policy, and strive to achieve a comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development of its 
energy, economy, society and eco-environment” (IOSCPRC, 2012: Part I). This quote and the 
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general tone in the energy strategy document of China implies that China is aware of energy 
security challenges and is taking actions to improve its energy security situation. 
As a part of achieving eco-environmental sustainability, the Energy Strategy of China presents 
natural gas as a cleaner and more sustainable source of energy for the future, than coal is today. 
China is aiming at reducing the consumption of coal and increase the use of gas in its energy 
mix. This will according to the energy strategy be a more environmentally sustainable solution.  
The BP Energy Outlook 2018 shows the predicted future energy consumption growth patterns 
of China, based on current policies and trends. 
 
Illustration 3.3: Energy consumption growth of China. Source: (BP Energy Outlook 2018 Edition, 2018: 56). 
The illustration to the left shows that energy demand in China will continue to grow, but at a 
lower rate than during the previous years. Unlike in the past, energy consumption growth is not 
driven by coal anymore. Rather, coal is likely to hit a period of decline. Furthermore, 
renewables will constitute the lion share of future growth, along with nuclear energy, oil and 
gas. 
The illustration to the right captures the same picture but is given by emissions by the source 
of energy. The Chinese strategy of reducing coal in energy production and increasing the 
amount of energy produced with gas and alternative sources is expected to reduce the total 
emission of CO2 in the long perspective. During this same period, the production of energy will 
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be increased using non-pollutive energy sources as well as gas, and that total energy 
consumption thus is rising - as seen in the illustrations. 
3.2 The “Belt and Road Initiative” 
- The Belt and Road Initiative is a comprehensive investment initiative of the Chinese 
government which is massive in both scale and scope. 
- The BRI has been proposed along the lines of the Northern Sea Route as well. 
Understanding the BRI is important for understanding the priorities of the Chinese 
government in relation to investment on the Eurasian continent. 
- With a few noteworthy exceptions as the US and Japan, the BRI has enjoyed a high level 
of interest and support in prospective countries, even though there has been a higher 
degree of scepticism vis a vis the initiative especially in some South Asian Countries. 
The Belt and Road Initiative is one of the most important strategies of Chinese international 
policy today (Swaine, 2015: 3). BRI is aiming to encompass in excess of 60 countries along the 
routes and lines of the initiative (Swaine, 2015: 2). The AidData working paper number 46 
(Dreher et al., 2017: 1) claims that the BRI is promising more than 1 trillion USD of investments 
to states included in the initiative. The initiative is not limited to an exclusive number or set of 
countries, it is self-proclaimed as being open and inclusive in its nature, inviting participation 
from all countries which could be interested. According to the BRI policy documents which 
were jointly published by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission 
(CNCRC), Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China, the “The Initiative is open for cooperation. It covers, but is not limited to, 
the area of the ancient Silk Road. It is open to all countries, and international and regional 
organizations for engagement, so that the results of the concerted efforts will benefit wider 
areas.” (NDRC 2015: part II - Principles). 
A specific point of emphasis for the policy documents and the message of authoritative sources 
is the importance of mutual respect, common benefits and peaceful development. This can be 
observed in the following quotes from official sources: 
“It (BRI) upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (NDRC 2015: 
Part 2 - Principles). 
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With other words, the Chinese government envisions a future in which the interaction between 
states is harmonious, and states generally can operate freely within their own jurisdictions. 
The Chinese wish of developing in close relation with other countries, as well as the Chinese 
ambition for the world to prosper may be seen in the following quote made by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping in front of the 19th CCP National Congress. He said that 
“We call on the people of all countries to work together to build a community with a shared 
future for mankind, to build an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting 
peace, universal security, and common” (Xi, 2017: 52). 
The official BRI policy outlines five major goals for cooperation:  
- promote policy coordination. 
- Promote facilities connectivity. 
- Promote unimpeded trade. 
- Promote financial integration.  
- Promote people-to-people bonds. 
As we can see in the following statement by Li (2015), the major goals may be divided into 
specific pieces of soft and hard infrastructure. He says that: 
“More specifically, the implementation of the initiative would involve trade and investment 
facilitation measures; infrastructure development (railways, highways, airports, ports, 
telecommunications, energy pipelines, and logistics hubs); industrial and sub-regional 
economic cooperation (primarily overseas industrial parks and economic corridors); financial 
cooperation; and the promotion of people-to-people relations” Li (2015: 3). 
Deriving from the policy areas presented in the policy documents, as well as the clarifications 
provided by Li (2015), one may say that the scope of the initiative is extensive. The implications 
will be seen in many sectors of the countries adjacent to the initiatives. 
A warning on the scope of understanding of the initiatives is however voiced by Professor 
Blanchard and Professor Colin Flint with the East China Normal University and Utah State 
University respectively. They say that researchers often make the mistake of discussing the 
initiatives as if they were one single initiative. They are however two initiatives, namely the 
Silk Road Economic Belt, as well as the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century – hence Belt 
and Road. They should also in many respects be understood as two different initiatives, as their 
geographical coverage and scopes are different. Continuing their lines of thought, they claim 
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that researchers in spite of their complexity discuss the initiative generally, and do not focus on 
a specific country or sector (Blanchard and Flint, 2017: 225). 
Following is an illustration of the main paths for the initiative: 
 
Illustration 3.4: The main lines of the BRI. Source: gisreportsonline.com (n.d). 
The project primarily consists of two distinctive routes stretching from the east to the west, 
namely the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). 
The MSRI is the purple route displayed in the illustration, stretching from South-East Asia to 
Western Africa and further to Europe. The Silk Road Economic Belt is the orange route showed 
in the illustration stretching from China through the Eurasian continent on its way to Western 
Europe. The project consists of a series of infrastructure projects along its way such as railways, 
roads, and power grids. Even though the initiative is presented as two main routes, the SREB 
creates prioritized economic corridors going in six geographic directions, increasing 
connectivity with adjacent countries and placing China at its very centre. 
In addition to the two best-known and most central initiatives, a third route named the Ice Silk 
Road was proposed by Xi Jinping in July 2017. This route was envisioned to go north and above 
the Eurasian continent along the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic. Until now, however, Russia 
has remained slightly hesitant about those prospects (Lukin, 2018). The Northern Sea Route is 
depicted in the following illustration: 
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Illustration 3.5: The location of the proposed Polar Silk Road. Source: The Arctic Institute, found in The New 
Daily (2018) 
The Yamal LNG which is the central case of this thesis is located at the port of Sabetta displayed 
close to the centre of the illustration above. The project is partly owned by the Silk Road Fund, 
and thus linked with the BRI. The fact that the Yamal LNG project is the single biggest Chinese 
investment in Russia does present an interesting point in the relations between the two countries 
(Lukin, 2018). The Yamal LNG project does not follow the two main lines of the BRI but is 
located along the proposed Ice Silk Road. This fact may also be taken as a piece of evidence on 
the evolving nature of the BRI and Chinese foreign relations. 
In writing my thesis, I will take the warning of Blanchard and Flint into consideration, and 
strongly narrow the scope of my investigations. I will primarily focus on the interactions 
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between the strategies of China and the Russian energy sector, and the Yamal LNG case 
specifically.  
3.2.1 Historical background 
In his speech in Kazakhstan in 2013, the Chinese president Xi Jinping and the government of 
China presented the idea of the revival of the ancient Silk Road. Shortly after, in another speech 
during a state visit in Indonesia, the President presented the idea of launching a maritime silk 
road. Hence the idea and policy of the Belt and Road initiative were unveiled. 
Following the initial proposal to launch the BRI, the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China went together in 2015 and published official BRI policy documents. These 
documents provide an overview of the initiatives and explained their overall purpose and 
philosophical orientation. 
In December 2017, a clear intent to continue with the BRI as a high priority in international 
relations was once again shown with the signing of a participation agreement between the 
special administrative area of Hong Kong and mainland China. The agreement obligated Hong 
Kong to fully participate in the BRI and help its realization on six fields; financing, 
infrastructure and maritime services, trade and facilitation of foreign investment, people to 
people bonds, development of Hong Kong industries, and improve relations and 
communication between Hong Kong and Mainland China. (Hong Kong's Information Services 
Department, 2017). 
During the time since its creation as an outspoken policy of the Chinese Government, a wide 
range of projects have been launched or pledged within the scope of the BRI. Examples of such 
projects could, for instance, be the opening of a train service linking Kouvola in Finland with 
Xi’an in China (Chinadaily.com.cn, 2017), construction of a high-speed railway linking 
Moscow and Kazan (Lu and Mo, 2017), and a railway line between Ethiopia and Djibouti was 
opened in 2018 (Li, 2018). According to (Marston, 2018), nearly 500 billion USD are reported 
to already have been pledged for investment within the framework of the BRI. 
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3.2.2 Institutions and practical implementation: 
According to CNBC, the funding requirement in the Asia-Pacific region alone is massive. For 
BRI to come to fruition, estimates quoted by CNBC run from 4 to 8 trillion USD (CNBC, 2018). 
As tools to realize and fund the initiative, the Chinese government has founded a series of 
institutions. In this section, I will name the most central funding vehicles of the Belt and Road 
initiative. Several of these funding vehicles are directly or indirectly associated with the Yamal 
LNG project (See chapter 4.2). 
The Silk Road fund is a 40 billion USD fund which was established in late 2014. The fund is 
directly controlled by the Chinese government, and its objective is to directly support the Belt 
and Road initiative (Silkroadfund.com.cn, n.d.).  
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a financial institution created with the 
purpose of developing the BRI is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB 
follows the lines of the BRI and has attracted a wide range of member countries. Prominent 
economies like the whole of BRICS, four of the G7, most of the European Union, Indonesia, 
and Australia are all members, in addition to a long list of others. As of now, and of special 
interest to this thesis, both Russia and Norway are members of the AIIB. 
The New Development Bank is another financial institution which promotes international 
investment and cooperation. According to HSBC is working for many of the same goals as the 
BRI (CNBC, 2018). The bank has an initial capital of 100 bn USD and is controlled by Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa. The bank was fully operational by the beginning of 2016 
(New Development Bank, n.d.). 
The Export-Import Bank of China is another institution controlled and employed by the Chinese 
government to fulfil the objectives of the BRI. According to its own web-page, it is “a bank 
directly under the leadership of the State Council and dedicated to supporting China’s foreign 
trade, investment and international economic cooperation” As a part of its responsibilities, it 
declares that the bank is “Pursuing win-win progress with other developing countries by 
fulfilling assistance pledges” (English.eximbank.gov.cn, 2014). As we can see, the mission of 
the bank is very much in line with the policy of the Chinese government, and the idea behind 
the BRI. 
Along with the Export-Import Bank of China, the China Development Bank has been 
encouraged to contribute with 200 bn USD to support the Belt and Road. This is in tandem with 
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a pledge by the four biggest non-commercial banks of China to contribute tens of billions of 
dollars (CNBC, 2018).  
In addition, the Chinese Government encourages private business and capital owners to 
contribute to the projects and to help the development of the Belt and Road initiative. As we 
can see above, the Chinese Government has thus taken aim at supporting the project with real 
and compelling bodies of project financing and to some extent cover parts of the investment 
demand. 
3.2.3 Reception of the world to BRI 
In talking about the Belt and Road initiative, the Chinese Government generally emphasizes 
the commonly shared benefits expected from the initiative. In the speech of President Xi Jinping 
to the 19th national congress, the president said that China is committed to the common 
prosperity of mankind. 
With the potential for other consequences of the initiative than just common development, 
various groups and countries may see the BRI in a different way than the official message made 
by the Chinese government. As an example of such questioning of the intentions behind the 
initiative, I offer the following quote found in an article about Chinese views on the BRI: 
“Although China has tried to downplay the strategic dimensions of the initiative, in private 
conversations many Chinese scholars would suggest that the plan is indeed partly a response 
to the strategic realignments that have been taking place in China’s neighbourhood in the past 
few years, particularly the US rebalance to Asia” (Li 2015: 3). 
In this quote, Li (2015) claims that some Chinese observers have observed the possibility that 
the BRI may have a function as strengthening the Chinese strategic grip on its neighbourhood. 
The author continues to say that it is an opinion in the foreign policy community of Beijing that 
China should have a clearer voice on the foreign policy stage than before. Whether these 
strategic observations run in counter to the Chinese message of common development, benefits 
and prosperity is however not covered in this thesis. 
Along with the idea of China increasing its strategic importance in Asia and countering US 
activities, it is interesting to make a point of the relations between OECD countries and China. 
As we can see from for instance the membership list of the AIIB, both the US and Japan are 
uninterested in signing up with the bank. They appear to be unwilling to support the Chinese 
ambitions in this regard. 
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If we on the other side look to the long-standing strategic partners of the US, many of them are 
already members. This is true for many European countries, Canada, Australia, South Korea, 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This means that many of the traditional allies of the US are supporting 
the initiative and opening themselves for influence by the Chinese Government. According to 
Wilson (2016: 114), Rozman (2014) argued that both China and Russia see the USA as a 
hegemonic and existential threat. 
For various reasons, Russia was initially slightly hesitant to support the BRI (Flake, 2013). 
Russia considers the Arctic region to be a clear national competitive advantage, and 
development of the region is a top priority. Russia has therefore been reluctant to allowing 
China too much leeway in the Arctic (Flake 2013). 
In addition to the Arctic regions, development of the eastern regions is regarded as important 
for the development of the country and Russian prosperity. Furthermore, relations between 
Russia and China have been characterized by fundamental scepticism and uncertainty of 
intentions. 
Russia has in the early 2010s seen Chinese rapid growth in importance in the Central Asian 
region and launched a series of measures designed to keep the Central Asian region as a 
traditional Russian sphere of influence close to Moscow (Freeman, 2017).  
However, Chinese influence in the region continued to strengthen, and investment, trade and 
political contact expanded. With the stand-off with the West over Ukraine and Russian 
involvement in Syria, Russian influence in the Central-Asian region may be declining 
(Freeman, 2017). Russia has recently increasingly realigned its foreign policies and 
organizations with the Chinese ones and started participating in the BRI. An example would be 
the decision in 2015 to link the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with the BRI (Wilson, 2016). 
An important example of Chinese investments in Russia put into fruition is the Yamal LNG. 
The importance of this BRI-linked project to the Russian development of the Arctic was as we 
saw above emphasized by president Vladimir Putin. With the Chinese Yamal LNG project 
involvement and Northern Sea Route Shipping, it could look like Beijing is developing the first 
small steps of its proposed Ice Silk Road. Even though Sino-Russian relations of today have 
been praised during dialogues, what the relations will be in the future, and what they amount to 
in practice, remains to be seen (Bennett, 2016). 
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India is another major regional Asian power, and it has been sceptical to certain elements of 
the Chinese BRI. Among the most questioned parts of the BRI is the China-Pakistan economic 
corridor and the debate over China’s string of pearls. Pakistan and India are traditionally 
unfriendly in their relations, and the economic corridor would run through the disputed and 
Pakistani-occupied Kashmir region (Brewster, 2016).  
India sees control over the Indian Ocean as very important for national security, and the Ocean 
has been hard to exercise control over for other powers. India is now cautious of China 
expanding their reach into the Indian Ocean by cooperating with surrounding states like Sri 
Lanka and Pakistan. The fear is that ports constructed by the Chinese in these countries may be 
used to impose military dominance in the region, and that improved Chinese connectivity with 
the Indian Ocean might breach the barriers of this relatively closed off ocean (Brewster, 2016).  
3.3 The Arctic Policy of China 
- Understanding the Chinese interests in the Arctic is important for understanding its 
present and future actions in the region. The investments in the Yamal LNG project is 
an example of such an action. 
- China has published an official policy paper on the Arctic, and China has clear interests 
to pursue in the region. Examples are scientific research, shipping, exploitation of 
fishery resources and other natural resources. 
- Although China promises cooperative conduct in the Arctic, there are some questioning 
on how China would operate in the Arctic as a partner. 
Chinese interest in Arctic questions is higher than for any other non-Arctic state, and it is 
growing. In this regard, Flake (2013: 681) says that “in the past decade, Chinese interest in the 
Arctic has steadily surpassed all other non-Arctic nations”. He justifies this claim by counting 
the total number of published articles on the Arctic as well as levels of Arctic research funding 
of non-Arctic states. 
A couple of years before the launching of the official White Paper on China’s Arctic Policy, 
Bertelsen and Gallucci (2016) made an interesting remark on Chinese interests in the Arctic. 
The authors argue that even though the presence of China in Arctic questions and discourse is 
strongly felt by the relatively small Arctic community, the interest of the Arctic within China 
itself is rather low. China is interested in many prospective areas and regions. The interest that 
the Chinese harbour for the Arctic, is mostly explained in energy, resource and transport terms, 
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and as a contingency plan or a hedge against unwanted occurrences (Bertelsen and Gallucci, 
2016: 3). 
The first ever official White Paper on the Arctic Policy of China was published on the 26th of 
January 2018. In this white paper, China outlines the policy it makes in relation to the Arctic, 
as well as the expectation it holds on the development of the region. China would like for the 
Chinese view to be recognized by the Arctic states, and for China to be able to operate there on 
the basis of their interpretations of international laws and conventions. In the opening section 
of the Arctic Policy, the Chinese State Council states that China in accordance with 
international treaties and law has a multitude of rights in the Arctic area, in spite of having no 
territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. The listed rights include “scientific research, navigation, 
overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant 
sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource exploration and exploitation in the Area” 
(SCIO, 2018: Part I). Furthermore, the Policy continues to list the rights granted signatory states 
under the Spitsbergen treaty, namely freedom to enter and access the islands, as well as hunt, 
mine or fish on equal footing as other signatory states and in accordance with the local laws.  
One of the arguments for the rights of China in the Arctic is that climate change research in the 
Arctic is of importance to China and that climate change will impact us all. China says that the 
retraction of Arctic ice already has led to changes in the environment, and that continued ice 
melting may lead to further adverse effects. However, in the same section, China points out 
how the retraction of the ice may lead to commercial benefits and possibilities for furthering 
development. Changes will according to the policy be felt strongly in global shipping, trade and 
energy supply. In relation to all of this, it is said that “the international community faces the 
same threat and shares the same future in addressing global issues concerning the Arctic” 
(SCIO, 2018: Part I). In other words, China will be affected by the governance and actions 
undertaken in the Arctic and has an interest in involving itself in the region. 
As stated in the section on the Chinese energy situation, China is in great need to source energy 
for its economy. The amount of energy resources assumed to be located in the Arctic is 
impressive (USGS, 2008). This makes the region look attractive as a source of energy supplies. 
However, the estimates of the energy content of the Arctic do however carry some 
methodological limitations and uncertainties.  
The Arctic is recognized by many as being vulnerable to external influence. This is according 
to China’s Arctic Policy also a part of Chinese awareness. Hence, political regulations may get 
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in the way of production of petroleum. Another obstacle is the physical characteristics of the 
Arctic themselves, as for instance temperature, ice and remoteness. The Technology and 
equipment required for production in these areas may prove to be very expensive (Jakobsen, 
Loe and Swanson, 2014). Otherwise highly attractive reservoirs may, therefore, prove to be 
economically unavailable. This all serves to reduce the Chinese interest in Arctic resources, 
even though it appears to be keeping its options open. This uncertainty about the region and the 
Chinese approach to that uncertainty can be seen in the following quote: 
“If production costs in the Arctic are significantly higher than elsewhere, there is little incentive 
for China to invest in infrastructure, besides supply diversification. The same goes for shipping 
and the Northern Sea Route: it will only be interesting if it can be scaled up and provides a 
distinct cost advantage compared to the Suez route” (Jakobsen, Loe and Swanson, 2014: 18). 
The Yamal LNG case production wells are located on land, and the project may turn out to be 
an example of an undertaking profitable for the Chinese Government.  
Shipping is specifically covered by China’s Arctic Strategy. China would like access to the 
waters and navigate them in accordance with domestic and international laws and treaties. 
China sees the Arctic as a highly prospective region for improving their connectivity with the 
world and thus improving its competitiveness on the world stage. China says that it respects the 
rights and authorities of the Arctic states but upholds that the waters should be regulated by 
international laws, agreements and treaties, and thus be open to all states of the world. China 
would like for disputes to be settled under international frameworks. 
On a similar notion, China’s Arctic Policy stresses hopes for joint cooperation on building a 
“Polar Silk Road”. China wants to work together with all parties to produce knowledge about 
the Arctic, work out procedures and navigational codes for the Arctic area, and to build the 
necessary facilitating infrastructure for the realization of the Polar Silk Road. 
Along with shipping, access also includes access to the fisheries in the Arctic high seas. China 
sees the potential for Arctic waters to increase in importance in the future, as world waters get 
warmer and fish stocks migrate to the north. Along with a claim to utilize living resources, it 
would also like to work together with other nations to maintain them on a sustainable level and 
be a responsible partner in the Arctic.  
In this regard, China envisions the development of an internationally binding legal agreement 
for the management of Arctic fisheries. China maintains that it is committed to preserving 
biodiversity in the Arctic oceans, as well as sharing the benefits from Arctic fisheries in a fair 
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way. The last point may be interesting for other fishery nations to take note of, considering the 
sheer size of the Chinese Fishery Fleet. In 2015, measured by the total catch of wild fish in 
metric tons, the Chinese ranks first with a staggering 17,59 million tons (Statista, 2018). By 
comparison, the second largest fishery nation would be Indonesia with only 6,49 million tons. 
The US ranks third with 5,04 million tons, Russia ranks 6th with 4,46 million tons, and Norway 
ranks 9th with 2,29 million tons (Statista, 2018). No other Arctic states make it to the top 10 list 
over fishery nations.  
Relating to Arctic mineral, energy and other non-living resources as well as tourism, China 
aims to be a responsible partner working with the Arctic states for their development. China 
states that it respects the sovereignty of the Arctic states and is committed to following local 
laws and to maintaining good conduct.  
As a last point discussed in China’s Arctic Policy, China stresses the importance of peace and 
stability in the Arctic. It stresses its commitment to help preserve peace and stability, promote 
a peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international laws and to mitigate security 
concerns. Safety work is also interesting with regards to Chinese Arctic tourism. China has a 
lot of citizens with a desire to see the Arctic zone, and China would like to work together with 
other Arctic states to ensure their safety while travelling. 
Scepticism 
In a recent briefing to the European Parliament, China’s Arctic Policy is being commented on. 
On several issues, the briefing questions the Chinese message, as well as analyses the Chinese 
intentions. According to the European Parliament briefing, the Chinese government has a 
tendency to convey two slightly different messages to the internal and external audiences 
(Grieger, 2018). The message presented externally usually presents the Chinese objectives in a 
more favourable and desirable way for foreign stakeholders. As an example, it is mentioned 
that the environmental focus of the English version of China’s Arctic Strategy differs slightly 
from the scholarly and political discussions being held within China, where the focus is on 
securing access to the abundance of Arctic resources. The emphasis on environmental 
protection and sustainability presented in China’s Arctic Policy is thus one of the issues under 
questioning. It is stated that “It remains to be seen what China's 'lawful and rational use of 
Arctic natural resources' will mean in practice” (Grieger, 2018). 
Another Chinese claim that is being challenged in the briefing of the European Parliament is 
the importance China places on the validity of international laws. The example employed to 
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drive this point home is how China disregarded the ruling in the dispute between China and the 
Philippines over shipping claims in the South China Sea. At the same note, it is said that China 
also ignored the ruling on the environmental impact of building the artificial islands in the South 
China Sea. Thus, it is suggested that China only will follow international laws and rulings when 
they are in line with their own national interests (Grieger, 2018). 
With the publishing of China’s Arctic Policy, it can be expected that China will continue to pay 
interest to Arctic developments and questions. China has attempted to portray itself in a 
favourable and responsible way, but its intentions are being questioned by some. As stated in 
the European Parliament briefing; “China will be measured against its actions rather than its 
rhetoric” (Grieger, 2018). The future relationship between Chinese words and actions in 
relation to the Arctic is thus put into question. 
3.4 Sino-Russian relations 
- The Sino-Russian relations have historically gone from good to bad in cycles. At the 
present the relations could be characterized as good but pragmatic. The partnership is 
as an example dubbed a ‘marriage of convenience’ by observers. 
According to Bennett (2016), the relationship between Russia and China has been changing 
throughout history. In the early 19th century, Russia supplied China with help and know-how in 
building its infrastructure, such as railways. The relations soured however during the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution and made cooperation practically impossible. With the normalization of 
relations after the fall of the Soviet Union and the recent world developments, relations are once 
again growing strong. 
A sign of strategic cooperation between the two nations can be observed in the Russian Pivot 
to the East, and the number of Chinese projects recently launched in Russia. Among them are 
the construction of the Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway and the construction of the new 
natural gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ from Russia to China (Tore, 2018) (Paraskova, 2018). 
Not everything is, however, all good. According to Flake (2013) there are some tensions and 
differences in interest between the two countries. As an example, he describes the reluctance of 
Russia to allow China into the Arctic Council as an observer state. Russia finally agreed to grant 
China observer status in May 2013, but only after being pressured to do so by other Arctic 
states, and after major changes to the requirements for becoming an observer state. 
Especially rights to shipping in the Arctic constitutes a point of division between the two 
countries. For Russia, the Arctic may be one of the only clear points in which Russia has an 
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advantage over China (Flake 2013). In terms of population, GDP and military, China has an 
upper hand. China on the other side is a major trading nation and may make substantial savings 
if it is allowed to navigate the Northern Sea Route along Arctic waters. It could also reduce its 
dependency on the supply routes going through the heavily trafficked and mostly US controlled 
Strait of Malacca. According to Flake in claiming indiscriminate navigational rights in the 
Arctic, China may have a strong economic incentive, as well as a sound claim in terms of 
international law. 
Bertelsen and Gallucci (2016) argue that following the recent change in the political climate 
between Russia and the West following the conflict in Ukraine, Russia has been cut off from 
Western investment and technology for offshore oil and gas ventures. In addition, Europe has 
started looking into diversifying their supplies of energy resources, and thus strengthening its 
energy security. This leaves Russia with few other alternatives than to turn to China for funding, 
technology and new markets. According to the authors, China knew about the situation of 
Russia, and the disparity of dependence, and was able to make agreements on long-term gas 
deliveries with highly favourable terms. According to Wilson (2016), there was a hope or 
expectation in the Kremlin that the consequences from the Russian standoff with the West 
would be mitigated by the Chinese, but this has not happened. It is pointed out that the Chinese 
investment decisions are driven by objective profitability calculations and a desire to source 
resources. With the options of Russia being limited, the dependency and negotiation between 
Russia and China may have been hard to manage.  
In addition, there seem to be tensions and especially Russian suspicions of the intentions of the 
Chinese in Eastern Russia. Chinese are interested in investing in resources and agricultural 
production on the eastern Russian territories, but Russia even though in need of the investment 
and development Chinese involvement would incur, is afraid of losing control over their 
territories following extensive Chinese activity. This may also be why very few projects of 
cooperation have been fully completed along the border between Russia and China  
Bertelsen and Gallucci (2016) are nevertheless in the opinion that the continued growth and 
maintenance of the Chinese economy will make China get further into energy and resource 
extraction projects in Russia (Bertelsen, Gallucci, 2016). This trend will most likely be 
strengthened with the recent involvement and inclusion of Russia in the BRI, as well as the 
relatively recent exclusion of Russia from the Western community following their involvement 
in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. 
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3.5 Sino-Norwegian relations 
- The Sino-Norwegian relations have historically been good, up until a recent down-turn 
due to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. 
- As of 2018, the relations are improving rapidly with top state visits and signings of 
cooperative agreements.  
Relations between Norway and China have traditionally been good. According to Sverdrup-
Thygeson (2016), Norway was in 1950 among the first countries to internationally acknowledge 
the new Chinese rule. It established its diplomatic mission in China in 1954, and on the 
background of the Cold War and some ideological differences, the relations developed to be 
relatively good. The researcher continues to explain how the relations survived the awarding of 
the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama in the 80’s, and how they were strengthened before 
and after the turn of the millennium. Both countries could offer something that the other party 
wanted, and Norway and China were engaged on high political levels (Sverdrup-Thygeson, 
2016). This all ended with the awarding of another Nobel Piece Price, this time to the Chinese 
dissident Liu Xiaobo. Liu Xiaobo was an outspoken opponent to the Chinese government and 
was put under house arrest for his political views. China was therefore deeply upset by Norway 
awarding a Chinese dissident the Nobel Peace Prize. 
Norway is an Arctic country, and during the time of cold relations between the two countries, 
China approached the Arctic states for a seat at the table of the Arctic Council. Flake (2013) 
says that China has been doing courtship with particularly Russia as a perceived gatekeeper to 
the Arctic, but also other Arctic countries than Russia to get this access to the Arctic Council. 
Russia was very sceptical about allowing China observer status in the Arctic Council, and the 
requirements for being allowed an observer seat was subsequently changed by the Arctic states. 
Despite diplomatic problems with Norway, and scepticism from Russia, it was allowed 
observer status with the Arctic Council in 2013.  
The reasons why Sino-Norwegian relations are interesting to this thesis are several. One reason 
is that Norway is positioned along the Chinese proposed Polar Silk Road. Thus, cooperation 
between Russia and China in the Arctic may influence Norway as well. An increase in the flow 
of goods along this Arctic route may present opportunities and challenges for Norway as a 
shipping and coastal nation. Cooperation on port development or maritime technologies may 
be examples of potential future possibilities. The need for sufficiently developed emergency 
and rescue capacities may, on the other hand, constitute examples of potential challenges. 
Another reason for Norway to be interested in this relationship is that it may be possible to 
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follow the Russian example and consider increasing cooperation with China in the Arctic, thus 
deriving indirect advantages from a Russian Chinese partnership. Opposed to this would be the 
relative loss of importance of Norwegian Arctic offshore expertise against Chinese 
technologies. If the Sino-Russian cooperation develops further, the Russian desire for 
Norwegian expertise may decline.  
In addition, Flake (2013) says that the Sino-Russian partnership may set the tone for the 
dialogue between the Arctic and non-Arctic countries in the years to come. As the relations 
between China and Russia are developing in the Arctic, other countries may want to seek 
opportunities in the Arctic as well and thus increase their diplomatic probing towards Arctic 
states.  
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4.0 The Yamal LNG case 
The Yamal LNG project is the central case for this thesis. It is a major Liquified Natural Gas 
project situated on the Yamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic. The project includes the 
construction of an LNG production terminal, development of a gas field, construction of an 
airport, as well as construction of ice-class LNG tankers for transportation. 
The investment made into the project was in 2015 estimated at a total of approximately 27 
billion USD (OilPrice.com, 2018). The initiator and largest shareholder of the project is 
Novatek. The company was targeted by sanctions on finance and technology from the West 
which made the project harder to achieve. Despite of the sanctions, the project managed to 
remain afloat and was able to open initial production in 2017. The oil and gas giant Total is a 
major investor in the project. According to the Registration Documents, the company was 
exempted from the sanctions by the French government and authorized to continue its activities 
as an investor in Yamal LNG (TOTAL S. A, 2017: 84). This may be one reason that the project 
survived. Another reason may be that the Chinese stepped in with investment, technology and 
manufacturing. This will be explored on a later point. 
The opening ceremony of the first part of the project was headed by the Russian president 
Vladimir Putin himself. This serves to signify the importance of the Yamal LNG project for 
Russia. In his opening speech, the president connected the importance of the project with 
securing the economic future of Russia, as well as developing the Northern Sea Route 
eastbound from the Yamal peninsula (Presidential Executive Office’s Information Office, 
2018). 
4.1 Historical background 
In October 2010, the Russian government adopted a Comprehensive Plan for opening LNG 
production on the Yamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic. In addition, Russian legislatures 
developed a new set of laws designed specially to develop the Arctic. From December 2013, 
companies in possession of a license to liquify their gas, or companies more than 50% owned 
by the Russian government which produces offshore fields or produce gas under a production-
sharing agreement are allowed to export LNG (Mitrova, 2013). In essence, the LNG export 
monopoly of Gazprom was lifted. In practice, export of LNG from Russia opened up for only 
a couple of large companies such as Novatek and Rosneft. According to Mitrova (2013: 28), 
other companies are effectively blocked to enter the international LNG markets without the 
involvement of Rosneft or Gazprom. 
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The same year as the plan for Yamal was adopted, Novatek had managed to send the first high-
tonnage ship with stable gas condensate along the Northern Sea Route from Murmansk to the 
Asia-Pacific region and finally delivered to China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
(Novatek, 2010). The current Yamal LNG project was chosen, and mainly owned and operated 
by Novatek.  
In March 2013, the construction of the planned LNG production facilities was approved by the 
Russian government (Novatek, 2013). By the time of the Final Investment Decision (FID) made 
in December 2013, the French international oil major Total had a 20% stake in the project, and 
Novatek had the remaining 80%. Yamal LNG, Novatek and CNPC subsequently negotiated an 
agreement of a purchase of a 20% stake in the Yamal LNG project by CNPC. At this moment 
in time, the partners had already invested a total of 2,6 billion dollars – a little short of 10% of 
the total estimated capital expenditure. The new ownership structure at the completion of the 
deal was then 60% for Novatek, 20% for Total and 20% for CNPC (Novatek, b, 2013) 
A new owner entered the project in September 2015, when the Chinese Silk Road Fund acquired 
a 9,9% stake of the project from the majority shareholder Novatek. The transaction was reported 
by Novatek to have a value of almost 1,1 billion Euro in 2016. Hence the ownership structure 
became as it is up to this day. Adding together the Chinese ownership shares means that China 
holds a total of 29,9% of the Yamal LNG project. 
Along with the series of ownership transfers presented above, several agreements for capital 
lending have been signed between various actors – many of them were Russian and Chinese.  
4.2 Owners and partners 
The Yamal LNG project is owned by Novatek PAO (50,1%), the French oil major Total SA 
(20%), CNPC (20%), and the Silk Road Fund (9,9%) (Yamallng.ru, 2018). 
Novatek PAO 
Novatek is one of the largest publicly traded natural gas producing companies in Russia, 
holding 11% of the total Russian natural gas production. It is involved in all activities from 
exploration to marketing of hydrocarbons. It holds total reserves of 12,8 bln boe of 
hydrocarbons and is globally the third largest publicly traded natural gas company based on 
reserves. The main area of Novatek is the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region, the same region 
where Yamal LNG is operating (Novatek.ru, a, 2018).  
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Illustration 3.6: The localization of Novatek assets in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region. Source: Novatek.ru 
(n.d.). 
The illustration above provides an overview of the Novatek areas of operation. The orange 
fields are producing areas, and the light blue fields are prospective areas belonging to Novatek. 
Total 
Total is a French international oil major with more than 98 000 employees and operations in 
more than 130 countries. According to the Total Registration Documents, the consolidated 
revenues of 2017 of 171 493 million USD make Total the 4th biggest international oil and gas 
major in the world (TOTAL S. A., 2017). In Russia, the company has 25 years of experience 
and approximately 180 employees (Total.com, 2017). It was one of the earliest owners of the 
Yamal LNG project and was present for the final investment decision. With the authorization 
received from the French government, as discussed above, it is allowed to continue cooperation 
with Novatek despite the current international sanctions regime aimed at Novatek and Russia. 
In addition to the direct interest in the Yamal LNG project, Total is according to its Registration 
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Documents also a minority shareholder of Novatek, with an ownership share of 18,9% per 31st 
of December 2017 (TOTAL S. A., 2017). French interests thus have an important share in the 
project. 
China National Petroleum Corporation 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has a domestic annual output of 102,54 million 
tons of crude and 103,27 billion cubic meters of gas and is the largest oil and gas company of 
China. It is owned by the Chinese government and has interests in assets and production in over 
30 countries (Cnpc.com.cn, 2017). The company is involved in exploration, production, 
engineering, marketing and refining of oil and gas products. The company controls 20% of the 
Yamal LNG project and is thus an equally big direct investor in the Yamal LNG project as 
French Total. 
Silk Road Fund of China 
The Silk Road Fund is a 40 billion USD fund created and controlled by the Chinese 
Government. The fund was officially established at the end of 2014 as an investment fund 
directly associated with the BRI. The fund was created with investment from the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, China Investment Corporation, Export-Import Bank of 
China and the China Development Bank. The objective of the fund is to “promote common 
development and prosperity of China and other countries and regions involved in the Belt and 
Road initiative” (Silkroadfund.com.cn, 2018). The involvement of 9,9% Silk Road Fund stake 
in the Yamal LNG project, therefore, suggests the project as being a part of the Belt and Road 
initiative. In addition to the ownership share of SRF, the fund has granted a 730 million EUR 
15 years loan to the Yamal LNG project (Novatek.ru, a, 2015). 
Additional capital providers 
The National Wealth Fund of Russia provided a loan of 150 billion Russian Rubles to the Yamal 
LNG project in 2015. This loan was followed up by a loan from Gazprom Bank and Sberbank, 
which granted a loan totalling 3,6 billion USD in 2016 (Yamal LNG, a, 2016). 
The Import Bank of China and the China development bank have together granted two major 
loans of 9,3 billion Euros and 9,8 billion RMB to the Yamal LNG project (Yamal LNG, b, 
2016). Out of the expected cost of 27 Billion USD for the project these loans constitute a major 
part of the entire estimated expenses. In addition to this, China Insurance Investment Ltd, which 
is a group of Chinese insurance companies and asset managers, has promised to fund the project 
with an unspecified amount (Zhang, Miller and Meijer, 2016). 
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Another source of financing was added to the list with the signing of a loan agreement with the 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). The loan agreement commits 200 million 
EUR to the project financing and was concluded during a meeting in 2016 between the Russian 
President and the Japanese Prime Minister (Yamal LNG, c, 2016). 
In addition, European banks have despite sanctions been active in providing financing to the 
project. The Italian bank Intesa Sanpaolo granted a loan amounting to a total of 750 million 
EUR. This loan was insured jointly by the French Export Credit Agency COFACE and the 
Italian Export Credit Agency SACE (Yamal LNG, d, 2016). In 2017, Yamal LNG signed yet 
another loan agreement with Intesa Sanpaolo, jointly with the Raiffeisen Bank International 
AG. The loan was at a total of 450 million EUR over 14 years. Furthermore, the loan was 
insured by the German export credit agency Euler Hermes and the Swedish export credit agency 
EKN (Yamal LNG, 2017). This signifies that the project has caught interest amongst European 
financial institution and could indicate that the investments are considered to be safe in Western 
countries. 
Adding together the loans from the ‘additional capital providers’, the project has received a 
total of roughly 19,3 billion USD in loans (with exchange rates per 28.11.2018), in addition to 
the unspecified amount provided by China Insurance Investment Ltd. The capital has been lent 
from a multitude of Russian, Chinese, Western and Japanese banks over a short time span. In 
other words, it would appear that the project has had few problems raising the capital required. 
4.3 Economic rationale 
The final investment decision was made in December 2013 (Novatek, 2013). The following 
chart displays the Global LNG prices up until this point and beyond: 
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Illustration 3.7: Global LNG prices. Source: Bluegoldresearch.com (2018). 
The chart is divided into five domestic LNG markets, and LNG prices in these markets have 
historically differed greatly. As we can see, for Japan, China, Brazil and to some degree Spain, 
the prices have been high, and volatile compared to the prices in the UK. 
When the final investment decision was taken at the end of 2013, prices were high. Two months 
later, prices started to drop significantly during the 2014 energy market price surge. This drop 
of energy prices struck energy companies and energy export-dependent economies, as for 
instance the one of Russia. The following graph shows how income from the Russian oil and 
gas sector contributed to the Russian Federal Budget: 
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Illustration 3.8: Brent crude oil prices and Russian oil and gas revenues to the Federal Budget. Source: U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (Barden, 2016). 
As we can see from the illustration, energy prices fell sharply in 2014. According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), the decline in oil and gas sector Russian federal 
budgetary contributions were to some extent both mitigated and enhanced simultaneously. The 
Russian tax system is created to allow the oil and gas sector to retain a larger share of their 
revenues for themselves when energy prices are low, and to pay more in taxes when energy 
prices are high. This made the oil and gas income for the Russian Federal Budget drop sharply 
as energy prices fell. On the flip side, the budget is measured in Russian Rubles, and during 
this period, the Russian Ruble depreciated against the dollar, mitigating the loss in Ruble terms 
(Barden, 2016). This relative depreciation of the Russian Ruble against the US dollar can be 
seen in the illustration above to the left. The dark blue graph portrays the oil price measured in 
USD, while the red line displays the oil price per barrel measured in Russian Rubles. We can 
see because of the depreciation, the dollar price of a barrel of Brent oil fell further than the 
Ruble did at the same time. Thus, with a downturn in energy prices and economic conditions, 
energy companies could maintain at a strong financial level and devaluation of the Russian 
Ruble could make the financial situation easier to manage. 
As another illustrative example, I find it interesting to mention how the Norwegian energy 
companies were hit. As a consequence of the sharp drop in energy prices, Statoil and other oil 
supply companies in Norway had to undertake extraordinary measures to cut costs and to save 
money. This included firing of excess staff and cutting of unnecessary spending. This stands to 
illustrate the severity of the decline in energy prices for the industry. Hence, I find it reasonable 
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to assume that the price shocks during the energy price downturn were large enough to influence 
the prospects for profitability and the margins of oil and gas projects. Since this was a period 
of a downturn in activity and prospects, the markets would normally be less inclined to be 
optimistic about new projects. 
Alexander Kornilov, an analyst with Alfa Bank estimated back in 2013 when the FID was taken 
that Yamal LNG would break even at $8.2/MMBtu (Golubkova and Vukmanovic, 2018). This 
is higher than the current levels of today, but as we can see from the chart above, the trend is 
once again increasing since April 2016. 
When the Chinese Silk Road Fund acquired 9,9% stake in the Yamal LNG project in March 
2016, the LNG prices were at the absolute lowest, as we once again can see from the graph in 
figure 2.5.1. At this point of time, the president of the SRF Wang Yangzhi stated that “we 
consider Yamal LNG to be one of the most prospective and competitive LNG projects in the 
world (Novatek.ru, b, 2015)”. On the web-pages of Total regarding the Yamal LNG project, 
the same message can be found. Total says that the Yamal LNG project is, in fact, one of the 
world’s largest and complex LNG projects but at the same time one of the most competitive, 
since it draws upon major onshore gas reserves (total.com, 2018). 
As a part of the initial investment agreements, the main actors of the project have pledged to 
buy a certain amount of the produced LNG. CNPC has pledged to buy 3 million tons of LNG 
per year for 20 years, Total 4 million tons of LNG per year, Gas Natural of Spain will buy 2,5 
million tons per year, Gazprom 3 million tons per year and Novatek 2,86 million tons per year 
(Weidacher Hsiung, 2016: 250-251). Adding the contracted gas together, 15,36 million metric 
tons of LNG/year has already been contracted in the years to come, out of the planned total 
yearly production of 16,5 million metric tons of LNG.  
According to Novatek, the Yamal LNG project holds a series of key advantages, which are 
listed on their web-page (Novatek.ru, b, 2018). Firstly, the reserves are large. Large reserves 
may make production cost per unit lower due to economies of scale. Fixed costs will be 
distributed on a large number of units, lowering unit costs. 
Secondly, the Arctic resources are located on land and not offshore. Russia has a lot of offshore 
Arctic resources as well, but these are harder to retrieve due to amongst others ice conditions, 
distances from land and the risk of petroleum spills. Onshore production may hence be more 
cost-effective than offshore production. 
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Thirdly, Russia has experience in developing oil and gas fields in the Arctic. Russia has for a 
long time produced oil and gas onshore in the Arctic. Hence, the geology of the reserves and 
the technologies involved in gas extraction are therefore well known to the operators. This may 
have a cost-reducing effect on production. 
Fourthly, the efficiency factor of gas liquefication is highly efficient because of the low 
temperatures in the Arctic. Producing LNG involves cooling gas to extremely low temperatures, 
and the lower the temperatures are, to begin with, the less energy is needed in production. 
In addition to these advantages, the project enjoys the support of the Russian state. Developing 
the Arctic resources has been a priority of Russia. As a means of achieving Arctic development, 
the Russian government has created a favourable tax environment. The incentivized tax regime 
created by the Russian government includes an exemption from the Mineral Extraction Tax 
regarding natural gas and gas condensate, annulation of the LNG and stable gas condensate 
export duties, as well as VAT exemption for equipment imported when there are no Russian 
made equivalents (Pravo.gov.ru, 2013) (Yamal LNG, 2014). Again, the attendance of president 
Putin to the opening ceremony, as well as his words as the Russian head of state shows the level 
of official support and importance given to the project. 
The markets for the LNG from the Yamal project are located in the East and to the West. The 
Northern Sea Route will be the transportation route for the LNG, but the passage is partly 
season-based. The westbound route to Europe is open year-round, while the eastbound route to 
Asia can be navigated during a seven months window in the summer season. Most of the LNG 
is according to (Weidacher Hsiung, 2016) destined for Asia – especially where it will not 
compete with Russian pipeline gas. It will follow the short eastbound route in the summer, and 
the long route via Europe and around the Eurasian continent in the winter. 
Operating in the harsh and remote environment of the Arctic may be costly in itself. Transport 
along frozen sea lanes using ice-class LNG tankers and ice-breakers may add to project costs. 
Some level of flexibility derives from LNG as a product, and Yamal LNG will to some extent 
have the possibility to serve the best-paying markets to the east and to the west. As summers 
get warmer, and icebreakers get better, the route is planned to be open for a longer period of 
time eastbound as well (Putin, 2017). 
Discussing the profitability of the Yamal LNG Project, it is highly interesting to look at the 
plans for a second Yamal LNG project, namely the Arctic LNG 2. The project is going to be 
located in proximity to the first LNG project of Novatek. In this project, the French oil and gas 
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major Total has already bought a 10% stake. As we saw in the Registration Documents of Total, 
it is also a significant shareholder in Novatek, and will thus hold additional indirect interest in 
the Arctic LNG 2 Project (Total S.A., 2018). In a press release made by Novatek, Total said 
that: “Total is delighted to be part of this new world class LNG project alongside its partner 
Novatek, leveraging the positive experience acquired in the successful Yamal LNG project” 
(Total S.A., 2018). The fact that the original partners are interested in being invested in another 
similar project is a good indication on the perceived success and economic profitability of the 
Yamal LNG Project. This is true even at this time, when LNG prices are comparably lower than 
when the FID for the first project was made. 
In conclusion, the project has various important benefits on the cost-reducing side, among them 
generous tax incentives. The project also enjoys official support at the highest political level, 
which may open doors and mitigate problems in the future. Access to both the European and 
the Asian markets enables Yamal LNG to sell to the best-paying markets and provides 
flexibility. Some challenges and additional cost drivers will be incurred by the project as a 
consequence of its location in the Arctic. Whether the project will remain profitable for the 
investors and the stakeholders remains to be seen. As a last point in this regard, the current 
pricing trend of LNG (as of autumn 2018) on world markets is going upwards and is now 
approaching the breakeven point calculated by Alexander Kornilov of $8.2/MMBtu. 
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5.0 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, the central theoretical concept of Energy Security will be examined. Energy 
Security is crucial for understanding the drivers behind the Chinese Yamal LNG investments. 
This will be explored further throughout the thesis.  
5.1 Energy Security 
The theoretical term of energy security will be investigated in the following sub-chapter. After 
this, I will discuss various definitions of energy security and choose a definition for this thesis.  
We all consume energy throughout our daily lives. We may heat a cup of tea in the morning, 
drive our car to work and turn on the projector for our important presentation on the latest 
operational numbers. Without energy to do these things, societal functioning as we know it 
today would be impossible. Imagine if the same shortage of energy would strike food 
production, food distribution, heating of homes, medical treatment or military capabilities. The 
consequences for a society would potentially be catastrophic, and thus, an understanding of 
energy security is important for national security. 
Energy security has played different roles throughout history and is defined differently by 
various actors. In articles regarding the history of energy security, the decision of Churchill to 
change the primary fuel of the British Royal Navy is being frequently referred to as a starting 
point of the importance of the theoretical construct. At the outbreak of the First World War, he 
transformed the fleet from being fuelled by domestically produced coal over to foreign and 
more efficient oil. This example shows an early example of reliance on foreign energy supplies 
for the success and security of a nation. 
Another instance in history with many implications for our understanding of energy security 
today is the 1973 OPEC oil embargo on the US and Netherlands over support of Israel. Prices 
went through the roof and countries had to rethink their approach to energy (Cherp and Jewell, 
2011). Energy security remains highly relevant. As an example, with disruptions of gas supply, 
and the recent development of the situation between western countries, Russia and Ukraine, the 
energy security of the EU and Russia is a hot topic (European Commission, 2014).  
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5.2 Definition of energy security 
A slightly traditional understanding of Energy security is offered by The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) which defines: ¨Energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy 
sources at an affordable price¨ (Iea.org, n.d.). 
IEA continues to explain that the long-term perspective of energy security is linked to sufficient 
investments made in future energy supply in line with economic development and 
environmental needs. The short-term perspective pertains to how well the energy system reacts 
to sudden shifts in the supply/demand balance (Iea.org, n.d.). 
Reading other definitions and articles offered on energy security, it is possible to direct some 
criticism to the IEA definition. The definition of the IEA takes to a large extent as its point of 
departure the perspective of consumers, and not as much the perspective of energy producers. 
This can also be seen at the need for “affordable prices”, rather than reasonable prices for both 
sellers and buyers. 
The focus of producers of energy will be largely the need for a sufficient demand for their 
energy, as well as fair market conditions and prices. Sellers may rely on getting their energy 
sold for supporting their own security. Russia is for instance in a situation of dependence with 
the EU in this respect. As a justification for this claim, about 70% of their crude oil and oil 
products exports in 2016 went to the European market. In turn, revenues from oil and gas 
activities make up 36% of the Russian federal budget (Eia.gov, 2017). A statement reflecting 
this perspective was made in the following sequence by OPEC delivered in a speech in 2008: 
¨Energy security should be reciprocal. It is a two-way street. Security of demand is as important 
to producers, as security of supply is to consumers¨ (El-Badri, 2008). 
This assignment does, however, discuss the energy security of China, which is an energy 
import-dependent nation. My definition will, therefore, be one with a more consumer-oriented 
wording. 
According to Leung (2011: 1331), the traditional definition of energy security made by Yergin 
(1988: 112) which says that the purpose of energy security is ‘‘to assure adequate, reliable 
supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national 
values and objectives”, fits the situation of China as an energy importer with clear national 
interests. According to Leung (2011), the national interests of China has been to create 
economic growth and maintaining stability.  
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In addition to this, it is argued that the traditional understanding of energy security may be 
outdated. Concerns over air pollution effects and climate change consequences of fossil fuels 
consumption make for a change of the traditional view on energy security. Sustainability has 
thus been introduced by scholars as a dimension of energy security, following the attention on 
the importance of environmental concerns in the consumption of energy (von Hippel et al., 
2011). This is in convergence with the recent energy policy line of China. China signed in 2016 
the Paris agreement on climate change as well as published a strategy aiming at reducing 
emissions from energy consumption to the air. China has been stating worries over global 
climate change, and the Chinese do now regard air pollution as a social problem (Yatsui, 2017). 
Because of this, the definition of energy security applied for my analysis will consist of 
availability, affordability, reliability and sustainability of supply. In the following, each element 
will be explained and will in chapter 6 be linked to the Yamal LNG Project. 
5.2.1 Availability 
Availability has traditionally been a central dimension in the definition of energy security, as 
seen in the official definition adopted by the IEA. This dimension implies that there are systems 
in place to ensure that the energy demanded is physically present at the market. Physical 
presence on the market and availability for the consumers may be secured in a wide range of 
ways. For ensuring availability, it is for instance necessary to invest sufficiently in the 
production of energy (Iea.org, a, n.d.). As in the case of natural gas or LNG, pipelines and LNG 
terminals will be necessary to physically supply the market.  
According to the IEA, energy availability is in the short-term could be challenged by shocks 
from sources as geopolitical conflicts, natural disasters and digital attacks (Iea.org, b, n.d.). It 
is therefore important for energy availability to prevent conflicts or acts of terrorism that could 
potentially threaten the energy supply to the market. I addition, it is important to ensure 
sufficient storages of energy as a backup. 
In addition to the previous points, in the long-term perspective, availability of energy will rely 
on technological development within energy production. As technologies improve, more 
energy deposits will become profitable and more energy forms will be made possible. 
Efficiency of oil and gas field production, efficiency of LNG transport, and development of 
renewable technologies are examples of technology-based improvement of energy availability. 
As Yergin (2006: 80) said, “there needs to be a continual flow of investment and technology in 
order for new resources to be developed”. We need look no further than the shale gas revolution 
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in the United States the last few years to understand the impact of improving technologies on 
energy availability. Since 2005, US energy production has risen remarkably (Rapier, 2017), 
increasing the physical availability of energy resources. 
5.2.2 Affordability 
The term affordability covers the price of the energy for the end consumer. For consumers and 
the economy to enjoy the benefits of energy consumption, it is important that consumers can 
afford the energy. Thus, physical presence on the market is not enough alone, as can be seen in 
the IEA energy security definition.  
As an example, according to The German Caritas Association, the affordability of energy across 
Europe is varying a lot. In a study, it is reported that as many as 47% of Bulgarian households 
find it too expensive to keep their houses sufficiently heated during the cold winter months. For 
reference and comparison, the number reported by Swedish households is as low as 1%. 
Inability to pay for the energy needed to stay warm has according to the article serious 
consequences on the general health of people in the European Union (Liddell, 2016). 
The term affordable does however not necessarily imply cheap. Rather, prices should be at a 
level which enables consumers to buy it, and encourages future investments in energy projects, 
and thus uphold long-term availability of energy. Thus, a price level that encourage future 
energy production and supply, as well as allowing the consumers of energy to afford the energy 
they need, is important to achieve. 
During my discussions in chapter 6.1.1, I will discuss the overall effects of the affordability of 
energy produced with coal vs gas supplied by the Yamal LNG project, as well as the overall 
effects of gas on the general price of energy. 
5.2.3 Reliability 
Reliability is the dimension captured by the word “uninterrupted” found in the IEA definition. 
This dimension appreciates the fact that disruptions of energy supplies may incur major 
consequences, and therefore ought to be avoided. Strengthening the resilience of distribution 
networks, diversifying sources of energy and creating emergency supplies of energy are all 
ways in which the reliability of energy security may be supported. 
As an example of how countries work on strengthening the reliability of energy, I would like 
to mention the works of the IEA. The IEA is a membership organization for energy importing 
OECD countries. All members of the IEA are OECD countries, but not all OECD countries are 
members of the IEA. The OECD countries have to apply for membership in IEA, and the IEA 
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has a series of conditions that must be fulfilled for states being eligible as future members. One 
example is that each member country must be able to prove that it has a total reserve of crude 
oil or oil products equivalent to 90 days of the net imports of last year (Iea.org, c, n.d.). This is 
a measure that directly pertains to the availability and reliability of energy resources. If the 
imported energy would be interrupted for a period of time, the government would be able to at 
least provide the society with energy for 90 days. This measure is a concrete example of how 
nations work to improve their energy security. 
5.2.4 Sustainability 
Sustainability of energy supply and consumption is the fourth and final dimension of my energy 
security definition. This dimension of energy security is the newest addition to our 
understanding of the theoretical construct, and only to a varying degree emphasised. As we saw 
above, the Chinese government has voiced concerns over the environmental impact of fossil 
fuels. Because of this, the energy security definition ought to include sustainability 
considerations. 
According to the Brundtland report named “Our Common Future”, “sustainable development 
is development that meets the needs of the current generations without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987: 41). This definition of 
sustainable development is today expressed slightly differently by the UN. On its webpage, the 
UN states that “Consisting of three pillars, sustainable development seeks to achieve, in a 
balanced manner, economic development, social development, and environmental protection” 
(Un.org, n.d.). Due to this clarification of the three specific dimensions of sustainable 
development, it will be possible to discuss the three consistent parts separately to say something 
about the concept of sustainable development as a whole. With other words, the balance of the 
interplay between these dimensions is important to consider when evaluating sustainability. 
Following this reasoning, the sustainability of energy would be under threat if the energy 
sources of the country are causing significant harm to the environment, to the society or if the 
energy sources are unreasonably economically unviable compared to other sources. 
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5.3 Geopolitics of oil and gas 
There are many definitions of the theoretical term geopolitics. Some of the definitions are 
general, others are more specific and sophisticated. In this section, I will attempt to offer and 
discuss definitions explaining geopolitics. A standard point of departure defines geopolitics as 
being “concerned with politics and the way that geography affects politics or relations between 
countries” (Collinsdictionary.com, n.d.). In other words, geopolitics tries to capture the 
interplay between states based on geographical features.  
To add another dimension, I will offer a second definition of geopolitics as “a combination of 
political and geographic factors relating to something (such as a state or particular 
resources)” (Merriam-webster.com, n.d.). The fact that the geographical and political factors 
relate to something in particular, is important for the following discussions. In the case of this 
thesis, the interest lies with the particular relationship between geography, politics and fossil 
energy resources, particularly gas. 
In addition, according to Leandro (2018: 83) “Modern geopolitics examines international 
affairs comprehensively, combining historical facts, geographical characteristics and the quest 
for security”. With the term ‘security’, both economic security and traditional security in the 
form of an absence of violence are included according to the author. Security is paramount for 
the prosperity of citizens and is the responsibility of the state. According to Leandro (2018), 
security is very important to human needs. He also says that the state is central in providing 
security for its citizens and plays a role on an international and domestic level. 
In this thesis, I have undertaken discussions from a realist and a liberalist perspective. Both of 
these perspectives on geopolitics investigates how a state can provide security for its citizens, 
but the solutions for how to provide security for its population are different for realists and 
liberalists. 
The dominant perspective in international relations has historically been that of realism 
(Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 2016: 8). Realism is defined by the online dictionary 
Britannica in this way: 
“Realism, set of related theories of international relations that emphasizes the role of the state, 
national interest, and military power in world politics” (Bell, 2018). 
The idea of realism is that states in their pursuit of safety and prosperity ought to seek power 
and influence in relation to others. Realists view international politics as a zero-sum game in 
which states play (Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 2016: 9). For a realist, there is anarchy in 
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international affairs, and it is no central power above the level of nation states (Bell, 2018). One 
way to play the game is to build economic wealth by for instance pursuing mercantilist policies 
of exporting more than you import. In other words, protect your own markets and penetrate the 
markets of others (Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 2016: 10). Another way to play the game 
is to expand the military strength and thus bolster the capabilities of the country in relation to 
others. 
From the perspective of a geopolitical realist, control over resources and desirable geographical 
features is important. Control over energy resources is one such example. The more you control, 
the stronger you will be in relation to other states. As we can see in the quote made by Blanchard 
and Flint (2017: 232) presented in the previous sub-chapter, we can see that they suggest that 
territorial control and capital accumulation are important for the MSRI. In the eyes of a realist, 
the world is insecure, and only a strong state acting in its own self-interest can play this zero-
sum game (Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 2016: 10). 
There is a range of theories falling in the category of realist thinking. The most distinctive of 
these theories are Classical Realism and Neorealism (Bell, 2018).  
As a counterpart to international relations realism is the perspective of international relations 
liberalism. This geopolitical perspective has emerged among the western countries after the 
Second World War and has established the current rule-based governance of international 
institutions and laws (Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 2016: 11).  
According to Cristol (2011: preview), there are a few basic concepts making liberal theories 
liberal. These are that “(1) states are the primary actors in the international system, but they 
are not unitary—domestic politics matters; (2) there are factors beyond capabilities that 
constrain state behavior; and (3) states’ interests are multiple and changing” 
In other words, politics can be cooperative, states are constrained by morals and the goals of 
politics are diverse. The author continues to say that “the key concepts found in liberal theory 
are absolute gains, international institutions, free trade, and democracy” (Cristol 2011: 
preview). 
Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau (2016: 10-11) say that in the view of liberalists, the 
government will follow the will of the people, and people are generally cooperative in nature. 
Truly free markets will be able to distribute allocate and distribute resources effectively, and 
integrated economies and democracy will reduce the chance of conflicts. 
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According to Cristol (2011), international laws and organizations are seen by liberalists as 
important for limiting the actions of states. International institutions regulate international 
politics, and safety and development will follow (Kuzemko, Keating and Goldthau, 2016: 12). 
Following the thinking of liberalism, the rules of for instance the World Trade Organization 
may provide stability, cooperation and prosperity in the world.  
Examples of theories existing within the category of International Relations Liberalism are for 
instance Neoliberal institutionalism, Commercial liberalism and Democratic peace theory 
(Cristol, 2011).  
In this thesis, I will base my discussions on the general ideas behind both the realist and 
liberalist thinking. I will not go into discussing the more refined theories of realism and 
liberalism, although I have mentioned some of their names above. What I want to achieve doing 
this, is to evaluate some of the actions and choices of China and try to say whether they follow 
a realist or liberalist mindset. 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework of energy security has been explored and explained. 
Energy security has been defined as consisting of the availability, affordability, reliability, and 
sustainability of energy. I have further explained how the energy security of countries may be 
under threat, as well as how countries can work to strengthen their energy security.  
In addition to this, I have presented the main ideas behind geopolitical realism and geopolitical 
liberalism. These two approaches will provide the geopolitical framework for my discussions 
in chapter 6.0 below. 
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6.0 Yamal LNG’s fit with core Chinese strategic goals 
This chapter constitutes the main focus of my thesis and will investigate how well the Chinese 
investments in the Yamal LNG project answer the strategic goals of China and the BRI. I have 
singled out on three goals; energy security, geopolitical strength and economic return. These 
are discussed in subchapters 6.1 to 6.3 below.  
The Chinese decision to invest in the Yamal LNG Project was clearly a government decision. 
Modern China was founded as a communist state and is governed by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Development goals for the state and the society are planned centrally in five-year 
plans and in a long-term perspective. The plans are then implemented and controlled by the 
government. Furthermore, public entities as both the China National Petroleum Corporation 
and the Silk Road Fund are governmentally owned and must act in accordance with the official 
will. 
The goal of this chapter is to discover how well the Yamal LNG project investments fit the 
strategic goals of the Chinese government with regard to the BRI, the Arctic Policy, and the 
energy policy. After this, I will seek to identify the importance of energy security as a driver, 
in relation to the remaining drivers. 
The initiative is from authoritative sources presented as being cooperative and mutually 
beneficial. The official Chinese message and line of argumentation is found in various public 
statements and articles. In his speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the CCP, the 
Chinese president Xi Jinping said that the goal of the initiative is to create a prosperous common 
future as well as a shared future for mankind (Xi Jinping, 2017). He also said that: 
“The Communist Party of China strives for both the wellbeing of the Chinese people and human 
progress. To make new and greater contributions for mankind is our Party’s abiding mission” 
(Xi, 2017: 52).  
From this, we can see the Chinese message to other countries. The government says that China 
aspires to create a better world and wants to make a contribution to the well-being of other 
peoples. 
The drivers behind the initiative may however still be many. Independent observers, researchers 
and analysts come up with alternative or complimentary narratives in addition to that offered 
by official China. It is argued by Wang (2016) that the initiative came to life due to especially 
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three major chains of events, as well as an international dependency on energy imports and 
maritime commercial sea lanes. He says that:  
“China’s Belt and Road initiative was actually decided when the Chinese new leadership faced 
the combined pressure of the economy slowing down, US Pivot to Asia and the deterioration of 
the relations with neighbouring countries after weathering the storm of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis” (Wang 2016: 455).  
Following the line of these arguments, Wang (2016) argues that the initiative may be labelled 
as a strategy of offensive for defensive. In another part of the speech by Xi Jinping quoted 
above, the following statement was made: 
 “Never forget why you started, and you can accomplish your mission. The original aspiration 
and the mission of the Chinese Communists is to seek happiness for the Chinese people and 
rejuvenation for the Chinese nation” (Xi, 2017: 1). 
Whether it is purely Chinese interests and aspirations or the wellbeing of the whole of mankind 
that the Chinese government finds important is hard to know for certain. However, I believe 
that it could be wise to consider the possibility of yes, no and both. In this thesis, a series of 
BRI drivers will be identified. They are all in accordance with the perception of Chinese 
priorities. 
Although the above-mentioned objectives and reasons for the Belt and Road initiative are grand, 
the initiative ought to address a series of smaller underlying challenges and desires held by 
China. Some of these challenges are according to Li (2015) challenges of overcapacity in 
certain sectors of the Chinese economy, the wish to more easily move low-cost production 
overseas, stimulate development and economic growth in the under-developed inner regions of 
China, and move foreign capital reserves into better investments abroad.  
According to Wang (2016), by 2014 the foreign exchange reserves of China amounted to 4 
trillion USD, of which 1,4 trillion USD was invested in US Treasury bonds. These bonds are 
relatively low yielding, and investments in projects in BRI countries may be more sensible for 
capitalizing on these funds.  
In addition, during our interview, both Professor S and Professor L (see footnote no. 1 on page 
6) stressed the importance for China to develop and export Chinese technology through 
investing. 
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The factors identified above as driving the Chinese BRI may be summarized in the following 
table: 
Factors driving the Belt and Road initiative and China's grand strategy 
Energy-related Improve energy security 
 Geopolitical Improve relations with neighbouring countries 
  Counter the US pivot to Asia 
 
Reduce dependency on traditional sea lanes 
Economic Move reserves of foreign currency to more profitable 
investments 
  Reduce overcapacity and facilitate the development of inner 
regions of China 
  Facilitate the ease of trade 
 Develop and export Chinese technology 
Table 6.1. Factors driving BRI. 
In the following sub-chapters, I will discuss the strategic fit of the Yamal LNG project 
investments with each of the identified drivers. In other words, to what degree are the Yamal 
LNG project investments able to achieve the strategic goals of the Chinese government? 
6.1 Yamal LNG strategic fit with energy security concerns 
Energy security concerns are identified as a driver of Chinese foreign investments in chapter 
2.2.2. Energy security is the central driver specifically mentioned in the problem statement and 
will, therefore, be the starting point in this analysis. Energy security is a complex and extensive 
concept and is defined in different ways by different actors. In this thesis, energy security is 
defined in accordance with the perspective of an energy importing nation. In addition to the 
traditional definitions, the definition in this assignment has a dimension of sustainability. The 
four dimensions of energy security of this thesis are therefore availability, affordability, 
reliability and sustainability of energy supply. 
In the Energy Policy of China, the Chinese government has the following to say about the 
Chinese energy development: “China's energy development must follow a path featuring high-
tech content, low consumption of resources, less environmental pollution, satisfactory 
economic returns, as well as security” (IOSCPRC, 2012: Part II). In the following sections, we 
will see what these elements mean for China, and what role the Yamal LNG project can play 
in helping China on its way to achieving them. 
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During my interviews with professor S, she said that the legitimacy of the Chinese government 
relies on economic growth and political and societal stability. Energy Security is in turn 
underlying both economic growth and stability. In addition, she said that the sustainability 
dimension of natural gas was very important to the Chinese government. China has problems 
with air pollution especially in the cities, from its energy consumption. In addition, China is 
according to professor S conscious about climate change problematics. China has therefore 
decided that gas should constitute a higher share in the energy mix of China. 
To discover whether Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG project hold the potential to 
improve the energy security of China, I will investigate to which degree the investments are 
able to answer concerns along the four dimensions of energy security; availability, affordability, 
reliability and sustainability. 
6.1.1 Availability of energy resources 
The availability of energy resources is one of the traditional dimensions of energy security. The 
dimension concerns whether the energy needed reaches the consumers in large enough 
quantities. For a large economy such as the Chinese, the energy demand is grand, and ensuring 
the availability of energy is essential. As seen in the theory chapter, availability may, for 
instance, be supported by building pipelines, energy terminals and discovering and developing 
ever new sources of energy.  
According to the Financial Times, during the winter of 2017, as the temperatures went below 
zero degrees Celsius, consumers in some regions experienced a shortage of gas for heating 
(Ft.com, 2017). According to the newspaper, this happened at the same time as people were 
banned from burning coal domestically. This example stands to testify that availability and 
reliability of energy in China at times is under some pressure.  
The political decisions of China and Russia to build hard and soft infrastructure and ensure gas 
deliveries by pipelines to China from Russia could be argued to increase the availability of 
energy. China has already managed to support the Yamal LNG project and receive Arctic LNG 
shipments.  
The Yamal LNG Project is a major LNG project scaled to produce 16,5 million tons of LNG 
per year. As a scale of reference for readers with knowledge of the Norwegian production, the 
Snøhvit project shipping from the Melkøya facility in Northern Norway produces LNG for 
export with an annual capacity of 4,3 million tons (Hydrocarbons-Technology, n.d.). The 
Yamal LNG project is thus almost four times as big as the Snøhvit project. While this is true, it 
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is said that the Norwegian LNG export accounts for less than 5 per cent of the total Norwegian 
exports of gas (Norwegianpetroleum.no, 2018). Again, for giving an idea about the size of the 
project, the facts above imply that the Yamal LNG annual production amounts to almost 20% 
of the total Norwegian export of natural gas. 
The total size of the global LNG trade in 2017 landed according to the International Gas Union 
at a record high of 293,1 million tons of LNG (IGU, 2018). The additional LNG deriving from 
the relatively competitive Yamal LNG may be increasing supply of LNG on world markets. 
As said in the background information chapter, CNPC has pledged to buy 3 million tons of 
LNG per year. This is gas that if delivered may increase the availability of gas on the Chinese 
market, and thus prevent future shortages – much in the same way as the pipeline gas. It could 
be said that when this gas reaches the Chinese market, the availability dimension of energy 
security would improve. The investments in the Yamal LNG and the adherent agreements have 
therefore in the opinion of this thesis been able to increase the availability of energy to the 
Chinese market. 
6.1.2 Affordability 
As seen in the theory chapter about affordability, this dimension is about whether the consumers 
are able to pay for the energy. As we also saw previously, the consequences for the population 
and the economy if the price of energy is too high can potentially be severe. On this note, I will 
now explore the effects of the Yamal LNG Project on the affordability of energy.  
The outset of the affordability discussion will be to compare the cost of electricity production 
from coal versus from natural gas. The policy of the Chinese government is to decrease the 
consumption of coal and increase the consumption of natural gas. The following illustration 
was found in the BP Energy Outlook of 2017: 
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Figure 5.2: Cost of power generation from new-built plants. Source: (BP Energy Outlook - 2017 Edition, 2017: 
42). 
The illustration shows the predictions made by BP regarding present and future production costs 
of electricity from new-built plants. The cost predictions are presented for four different sources 
of energy; solar, wind, coal and gas (BP Energy Outlook - 2017 Edition, 2017).  
- Cost of production from renewable sources as solar and wind is estimated to follow a 
downwards-facing development trend. 
- The cost of fossil fuel-based electricity production from coal and gas is estimated to 
increasingly become more expensive in the future. This is partly due to the expected 
increases in carbon dioxide emission taxes applied on a per ton basis. 
- The present situation where electricity production with gas is more expensive than with 
coal will even out slightly in the future in the view of BP. The price gap between coal 
and gas electricity production will with other words become narrower. 
From the estimates of BP, we can read that production of electricity using natural gas in fact is 
more expensive than production of electricity using coal. In a pure affordability analysis, 
transferring electricity production from coal-based production to natural gas-based production 
will potentially increase the cost of energy for Chinese consumers. This is however only one 
isolated part of the discussion and excludes other factors. 
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As we saw under the discussions of availability of energy resources, the Yamal LNG Project 
will contribute with quantities of LNG totalling 20% of the total Norwegian gas exports. The 
additional supply of gas will thus help increase supply, and help lowering the global LNG 
prices. The LNG from this project may, therefore, lead to lower prices for Chinese consumers 
and higher returns for Chinese firms.  
According to the IGU (2018), the demand for LNG, in fact, increased correspondingly with the 
production. The Asian region was the leader of the demand growth. China alone contributed 
with 12,7 million tons of LNG demand increase alone. The four next countries South Korea, 
Pakistan, Spain and Turkey aggregately contributed with 11,9 million tons of the demand 
growth (IGU, 2018). 
The demand of China is in addition expected to increase in the years to come, as we can see in 
the graph shown in the section on the energy situation of China. This means that as Chinese 
demand increases for natural gas and LNG, the prices may increase as well. The dynamics 
behind the price developments of LNG in the future are however complex. Except for the fact 
that increased production and availability of LNG on the world markets may function to reduce 
LNG prices, the complexity of the dynamics behind the LNG price developments would, in my 
opinion, be slightly outside of the scope of my thesis. 
An interesting point can be made with regards to the availability, reliability and affordability of 
LNG on the fast-growing Asian LNG markets. As we can see from illustration 2.5.1, the prices 
of LNG tend to increase drastically for Japan, China and Brazil during the winter season. This 
is a cold period and is associated with an increased demand for energy. Coincidentally, this is 
also the period of time that gas deliveries from the Yamal LNG project are impossible along 
the Northern Sea Route going eastward. This means that the LNG may have to travel the long 
way via Europe and through the Suez Canal in order to reach the Asian market during the winter 
months.  
As I see it, this fact has implications for both the affordability for Chinese energy companies 
and consumers, as well as for the Yamal LNG project profitability. Increased supply may reduce 
the prices on the Asian market for LNG. This goes hand in hand with the fact that winter-prices 
on LNG on the Asian market may help cover the additional cost of transporting the LNG the 
long route. 
Professor S made an interesting observation on energy security during our interview. She said 
that affordability is not a top concern of the Chinese government. “China can invest a huge 
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sum in energy projects, and whether the project is affordable or not is not a top question for 
Chinas’ concern. What concerns China is the availability and reliability dimension of energy 
security”. On this notion, she says that in her opinion, this is both regarding the gas it purchases 
as well as the project it invests in. If China would have been allowed to, Professor S believes 
that China would have liked to have invested even more than the present percentage ownership 
in the Yamal LNG Project. 
This is to a certain degree in agreement with the statements of professor L. He said that the 
state-owned corporations of China need to obey the instructions of the Chinese government. He 
also believed that the political motivations behind the investments were the most important to 
China and that it would be hard at this point to say whether the Yamal LNG Project would be 
a profitable investment or not. 
Even though affordability of the gas and project investments is not a top concern for China, 
professor L made a remark saying that the state-owned companies are still corporations and that 
they have a requirement on making profits in addition to following governmental instructions. 
Questions about economic performance are thus still relevant in this regard.  
As a conclusion on the discussions of the affordability dimension of energy security, I will say 
that increased supply of LNG on the world market, and the Asian market, in particular, may 
help decrease the cost of natural gas for Chinese companies and consumers. The additional 
energy from the LNG supplied may also increase the total amount of energy on the market, and 
thus help reduce overall energy prices. As for the cost of energy production from natural gas 
compared to energy production from coal, natural gas is more expensive. Thus, seen isolated, 
transferring the energy sector from coal to gas may work to increase the cost of energy for 
consumers in China.  
I need to consider the cost-reducing effects of natural gas on the total energy consumption, as 
well as the cost-increasing effects of including relatively more expensive natural gas in the 
energy mix. Doing this, it is hard to say whether investing in the Yamal LNG project and 
purchasing an additional 3 million tons of LNG per year will help Chinese consumers with the 
affordability dimension of energy security. I therefore remain undecided in this regard. 
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6.1.3 Reliability of energy resources 
Reliability of energy resources is an important part of energy security, and an element included 
in the traditional definition given by the IEA. Reliability means that the gas will be available 
whenever it is needed and that disruptions will be limited.  
As presented in China’s Energy Policy, China is vulnerable to the effects of supply disruptions 
due to its small energy reserves and weak energy response capabilities. The policy says that “it 
will not be easy for China to maintain its energy security since its energy reserves are small 
and its emergency response capability is weak” (IOSCPRC, 2012: part I).  
One point stressed by professor S is the effects on the reliability dimension of energy security 
deriving from the contractual nature of LNG trade. Gas is traded by contract while oil is traded 
in the spot market. If gas is traded by contract, it makes it more reliable than energy traded in 
the market. Most of the energy relations between China and Russia is done by contracts, which 
according to the professor is different from just purchasing from the market.  
In addition, China is worried about its dependence on the Middle East as an oil and gas 
producing region rather prone to conflict. It is also concerned about its dependence on maritime 
sea routes, and on congested passageways as the strait of Hormuz and Malacca. 
According to professor S, in relation to the Chinese energy dependence on Middle Eastern 
countries, the Yamal LNG project investments are very interesting. She repeats that the region 
is rather unstable. As an example, she mentions the fact that President Trump recently pulled 
the US out of the Iran Nuclear Deal.  
However, on the positive side, she says that the diplomacy of China is able to operate in the 
Middle Eastern countries quite effectively because of the Chinese policy of not criticizing 
domestic policies of partner nations, has created an economic interdependence in trade, and 
having no colonial legacy. Nevertheless, China is aware of its dependence, and as of the 
previous year, Russia has overtaken from Saudi Arabia the first place of Chinese energy 
suppliers. 
Winston Churchill once said that "Safety and certainty in oil, lie in variety and variety alone" 
(Yergin, 2006: Introduction). The author continues to explain that the term energy security 
today entails many more dimensions than when Churchill made this quote Yergin (2006). For 
both oil and gas, diversification will, however, remain a central principle. Some Arctic sources 
are geographically closer to China than some of the traditional origins. This line of thought is 
supported by the following statement: “Overall it is clear that China has a deep strategic 
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interest in security of supply of energy, raw materials and sea-lanes, which is the framework 
for its Arctic interest”. (Bertelsen, Gallucci, 2016: 4). The supply lines from Arctic sources 
would go through the Northern regions and would be different from the traditional routes. 
In the case of a major world disruption, it could be important for China to have diversified their 
channels of energy supply. This has been done and could be done in several ways. Russia and 
China have for instance in 2014 signed major agreements for delivery of pipeline gas from 
Russia.  
Imports of gas from the US and Australia also offers a way of diversification of both shipping 
routes and country of origin. However, these sources of diversification carry with them some 
challenges. As we saw in the background information chapter, both the US and Australia have 
been challenging some Chinese interests, as for instance Chinese control over the South China 
Sea. On the notion of diversifying gas supply sourcing LNG from Australia, professor S 
mentions that Australia is not as friendly towards China as it once was. In addition, Australia 
has close relations with the US. This makes the Chinese government suspicious towards the 
Australian government’s intentions.  
From a liberalist perspective as described in the theory chapter, this dependence on Australian 
and US natural gas would not be a concern. This is because the gas supplied is priced and traded 
on the open market. Another point built on the liberalist thinking is that it is good for peace and 
development between countries to do business and trade together. This is due to the principles 
of economic interdependence. In other words, it will be hard for two economically 
interdependent countries to engage in conflicts with the other. 
From a realist perspective on the other hand, the picture will be different. With territorial and 
military differences, relying on Australia and the US for gas could be a cause of national 
concern. From a realist perspective, China should try to diversify its supply of natural gas away 
from Australia and the US to avoid dependence on possible adversaries. 
Future diversification of supply lines may be achieved by the establishment of the BRI 
economic corridor going through Pakistan, stretching from south-western China to the Indian 
Ocean. This corridor makes it possible for China to avoid the Indian Ocean and the South China 
Sea when transporting goods along the sea lanes from east to west.  
The deliveries from Yamal LNG would be yet another way to diversify from the traditional sea 
lanes of transportation. The LNG and other goods would arrive from the north instead of the 
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south, going past a possibly friendly Russia. The deliveries of gas from the Yamal LNG will, 
however, be partly season-based.  
This is according to professor L a way China views the NSR in terms of diversification and 
reliability of energy supply. “In the south, the Malacca Strait and the Bosporus Strait across 
Turkey are controlled by Turkey or the United States have very strong influence in these places. 
From this perspective, China thinks of energy security with these challenges”.  
He continues to say that “This is such a problem already. This route in the north east… Let’s 
say that China can avoid the control of the straits in the south. That they are controlled by some 
other countries”. 
This perspective is also echoed by professor S. She says that the Hurmuz and Malacca Straits 
are open for traffic by all, but that American control over the sea lanes and transportation is the 
under-the-table concern of the Chinese government. At the moment China can take advantage 
of the safety provided by America, but the control over the lane is still in the hand of another 
country. The professor says that “This is not a safe and comfortable situation for Chinas’ 
government. Because China is you know, a big country... It is not very... It is not safe if the 
security of your transportation is controlled by someone else than China. This is why China is 
improving its blue-sea (Naval – my comment) capability”. 
As it appears at this point, with relation to its energy supply lines, China is giving importance 
to both the liberalist and the realist perspective on geopolitics. China is trading with countries 
based on the rules of the market. This is happing at the same time as it is trying to develop 
alternative supply lines under its own influence and control. As stated by the professors above, 
China is uncomfortable having its supply lines under the control of other world powers. 
During the summer months, the Northern Sea Route will be navigable, and transport of LNG 
and goods along the route will be possible towards the east, and towards the Asian market. As 
we have discussed before, the gas going east will also to a lesser degree compete with gas 
transported by Russian pipelines, as could be the case in the European gas market. 
In the winter, the route going towards the east will, however, be closed for navigation, and the 
gas destined for the Asian market will have to be transported westwards. The route will then go 
along the Russian coast, past Norway, to Europe and possibly further to distant markets. This 
route would for China be substantially longer than the route from traditional sources. In addition 
to this, the diversification of sea routes previously achieved along the Northern Sea Route 
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during the summer months would be effectively gone. The deliveries in the winter months 
would be dependent on the congested straits along the way from Europe to Asia and exposed 
to foreign control.  
The reliability of supply is therefore due to the investments in the Yamal LNG project 
and adherent agreements increased. This increase is, however, only present in varying 
degrees and at certain seasons. Simply due to the delivery contract of LNG, the reliability has 
been argued to be improved. In addition, due to the diversification of supply routes during 
certain times of the year, reliability could be argued to be improved during the summer months. 
During the winter months, however, direct supply of LNG from the Yamal LNG project to 
China may be rather limited and along the lines of traditional routes. Thus, the expected 
improvement in reliability of energy supply from transport route diversification may be 
effectively gone in the cold months of the year. 
6.1.4 Sustainability of energy resource investments 
The sustainability of the energy source and investment is the last dimension of the theoretical 
concept of energy security, as defined in this thesis. As stated in the theory section, the three 
dimensions of social, economic and environmental protection all play in on the overall concept 
of sustainability. I will now attempt to investigate how Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG 
affects the three elements of sustainability of Chinese social development, environmental 
development, and economic development.  
Firstly, social elements of sustainability of energy resources include the political acceptability 
of the energy source. Russia is a partner of China, as shown by their cross-border investments, 
and their participation in BRICS; an association including Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa aiming at coordinating systems and cooperate. Thus, Yamal LNG could be a way 
for China to deepen its relations with Russia – something which will be covered in the upcoming 
parts of the discussions. As China traditionally is heavily dependent on other sources for its 
energy resources than Russia, and China wants to improve its relations with Russia in some 
areas, it may be concluded that Russia as a source of energy is politically acceptable for China. 
According to professor S, sustainability in energy security is not only of the energy supply but 
also the consequence of energy consumption. “From a sustainability perspective, coal and oil 
are not as sustainable as natural gas”. Natural gas has according to the professor thus more 
energy security implications than other forms of fossil energy. In the following paragraphs, 
I will elaborate further on this. 
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A large portion of the electricity produced in China is generated in coal-fired energy plants. 
Burning coal for energy is considered to emit high amounts of pollutants each year. One of 
these are the PM2,5 particles, in the daily speech called smog, and have turned into a health 
concern in China (Stanway, 2018). Especially in the cities, the air quality has become so bad 
that it is damaging to the health of people. In fact, it is estimated that 1,6 million Chinese people 
today die prematurely from the air quality per year (Stanway, 2018). As a side note, while we 
were in China, we were told to be conscious about how much we were jogging along the streets 
of Shanghai. The poor air quality, we were told, could make jogging more damaging to health 
than whatever benefits we would get from exercising. 
In addition to this, with the recently agreed upon Paris-Agreement, world Greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) is a hot topic of discussions and research. China has committed itself to 
reducing its environmental impact. 
To tackle the pollution of the air, China has decided to limit the amount of coal, and use more 
gas in their overall energy mix. Gas is a cleaner source of energy than for instance coal and is 
by advocators mentioned as one of the components in a more sustainable energy mix 
(IOSCPRC, 2012). As an effect of Chinese policies, consumption of coal is expected to slowly 
decrease, and gas consumption is expected to increase in the years to come. 
According to professor L, one of the greatest challenges in the field of energy is to transition 
from coal to natural gas. Especially in the winter, Chinese households burn coal for keeping 
warm, due to the cold winters of China. The Chinese president Xi Jinping is according to the 
professor highly concerned about the environment and the air quality of China. He is, therefore, 
determined to make the energy mix more environmentally friendly. Professor L said that: 
“China is such a country that can change domestic policy very easily. For if we decide to 
change fuel from coal to natural gas. If the central government has such a plan, the local 
government will have to obey very quickly”. 
As an example, to prevent severe pollution, the Chinese government recently in some regions 
banned household-burning of coal during the winter. This happened at the same time as the 
Chinese consumers experienced shortages of gas on the Chinese market, and people were 
unable to heat their homes. In the newspaper Financial Times, it is said that a Chinese hospital 
had to write a petition arguing that surgeries would effectively be impossible as a consequence 
(Ft.com, 2017). This stands to demonstrate the importance the Chinese government places on 
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improving the air quality for the people. It also shows exactly how harmful to air quality coal 
is considered to be when burned, in relation to gas.  
From a social sustainability perspective, it is, however, important to remember the importance 
for people to meet their basic energy needs. The fact that people were left with shortages of gas 
and no other alternatives pertains to the availability, reliability and affordability dimension of 
energy security. If these three dimensions of energy security are not maintained, it is under 
question whether the transition is socially sustainable in its present form. 
As an additional point, the international image of China is influenced by the pollution levels of 
China, and how it lives up to international responsibilities. Professor S said that “It is very 
important for China to cooperate internationally, so the international image of China is also 
influenced by its energy sources”. Thus, if China manages to reduce its emissions from burning 
fossil fuels, it may indirectly contribute to strengthening the political acceptability of the energy 
supply of China by improving Chinas image internationally. 
Using more gas in the energy mix and at the same time using less coal may be said to be capable 
of improving the environmental impact of energy production. I would, therefore, argue that 
LNG from the Yamal LNG Project investment agreements improves the environmental 
acceptability of the sustainability dimension of energy security. It is however important that the 
policy of fuel transition is implemented in such a way that consumers of energy do not suffer 
unnecessarily. In addition to the environmental direct positive effects, the investments are 
indirectly able to improve the social acceptability of the sustainability dimension of energy 
security by improving the image of China internationally on the field of environmental 
protection. 
Secondly, on the economic sustainability of the Chinese Yamal LNG Project investments, I 
will support myself on the discussions provided further below in the thesis. These discussions 
can be found in section 6.1.3 “Economic reasons for investing in Yamal LNG”. In section 6.1.3, 
I have discussed economic questions in detail. In this section, however, I will summarize some 
of my findings.  
It appears that China as a capital lender can expect interest payments in excess of other options, 
as for instance American 10-year bonds. Secondly, the project enjoys a series of local 
advantages, as well as benefits from the Russian government and appears to have a special 
status. From my discussions on this point, it is therefore possible to say that the project is 
deemed competitive.  
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China has landed a production agreement for Yamal LNG Project equipment. For more detail, 
see the chapter on the economic reasons for the Yamal LNG investments. As a conclusion on 
economic sustainability; if China expects to receive dividends as an owner of the project, as 
well as interest as a capital lender in excess of other alternative investment options, the 
investments may be argued to be economically sustainable. 
Economically, natural gas has on the other hand proven to be a more expensive option than 
coal. In addition to this, while coal is produced domestically in China, the additional natural 
gas must be imported from other countries. Thus, purely from an economic perspective, energy 
prices may overall increase for Chinese consumers, and the value added in energy production 
may now be created abroad instead of in the Chinese domestic energy production. It may, 
therefore, be said that the transition from coal to LNG may incur both positive and negative 
economic effects to China. Financial sectors may stand to gain while the coal production sector 
may stand to lose economically. 
As long as the three first dimensions of energy security are fulfilled, I argue that the social, 
environmental and economic sustainability dimension of energy security will be improved by 
investing in the Yamal LNG project and increasing the share of natural gas in the energy mix. 
This is both an advantage for consumers as well as for producers. 
6.1.5 Summary of the strategic fit of energy security as an investment driver 
In the previous sections, I have discussed how energy security has been an investment driver 
behind the Chinese investment decisions in the Yamal LNG project. The theoretical concept of 
energy security was divided into four distinct constituent parts. Following the discussions of 
each element, I concluded that investment in the Yamal LNG project may directly - or may 
hold the potential to - improve the energy security situation of China. 
6.2 Strategic fit with geopolitical drivers 
In this sub-chapter, I will discuss each of the three identified geopolitical objectives; namely 
improve the relations with neighbouring countries, counter the US pivot to Asia, and to improve 
connectivity on land, and thus reduce dependency on sea lanes. I will then explore whether the 
Chinese Yamal LNG investments are capable of helping China achieve these objectives. 
6.2.1 Improve relations with neighbouring countries 
Improving relations with neighbouring countries has been identified as a motive behind the Belt 
and Road Initiative. According to Wang (2016: 455), the financial crisis made China focus 
more on its own economy and development, and therefore lost some external influence. By 
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increasing connectivity and helping neighbouring countries develop and thrive, China hopes to 
create regional stability and to create future benefits. 
During my interview with professor L, he said that some argue that one of the main reasons for 
China’s going abroad with the Belt and Road initiative and for Sino-Russian relations, is that 
China needs energy from Russia – including Central Asia. He continues to say that China 
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has improved relations with Central Asian 
countries and participated in construction of energy pipelines going from Central Asian 
countries as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China. Russia has however voiced concerns over 
the close relations between China and Central Asia, according to the professor. 
The investments in the Russian Yamal LNG project were done in a financially hard time for 
Russia when it had to fight the consequences of a downturn in energy prices combined with the 
effects of western sanctions over Crimea. The Chinese investments, as well as the Chinese long-
term deals to buy Russian gas, may, therefore, have been important to help the Russian 
economy. During our interview, professor L said that “In 2014 China and Russia... both parties 
decided to push the strategic partnership into a new phase. The Yamal project is a concrete 
project to testify – To prove the China-Russia strategic partnership. To make a big success. 
This point is very clear”.  
By seeking to strengthen the relations during difficult times, cooperation has increased between 
the two countries at the same time as relations between China, Russia and the west have 
deteriorated. 
According to (Overland and Kubayeva, 2017), the cooperation between China and Russia had 
started increasing even before western sanctions were imposed on Russia - perhaps even in 
expectation of western sanctions. The level of Chinese investment is nevertheless according to 
the researchers exaggerated by the media, and not reflected well by reported financial numbers. 
The Chinese foreign direct investment to Russia increased slightly before the time of the 
annexation of Crimea but fell to lower levels shortly after this. Since the investments from 
China increased already before the western sanctions on Russia were imposed, Overland and 
Kubayeva (2017) however find no reason to say that China bankrolled the annexation of 
Crimea. 
The researchers continue to state that according to their analysis, the relationship has not 
reached a point where the two countries identify with one another. It is rather a ‘marriage of 
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convenience’, and the two countries approach each other when they need something, as for 
instance money and markets for Russia, and resources at a good price for China.  
This view may to some degree have been supported during my interview with professor L. He 
says that: “China and Russia’s strategic partnership is basically very positive. People in both 
Russia and China have a very positive attitude. A few people not only in China but also in 
Russia mistrust each other. This is for historical reasons”. He explains how the relations 
between China and USSR and later Russia have been changing in cycles of ten years, with 
border wars in 1969. “Before 1949, people would always say that ‘Russia got almost one million 
square kilometres of territory from China. Still, some people bring up this point”. Even though 
the relations have improved dramatically, he says that “I always say that compared with China 
and Russia’s strategic partnership, the problems exist between us just below… On the second 
level”. According to the professor, this does not necessarily have that much to say, because the 
leaders of the two countries trust each other. “This is why the relations improved so fast in the 
90s’”. 
During my interview with professor S, a similar perspective was emerging. On a question 
whether the energy cooperation and investments improve relations in other areas as well, or 
only in the energy sector, Professor S said that: “I think its influence is very limited to other 
areas. Only for energy itself. Energy relations is influenced more by international politics”. 
Russia had to increase its cooperation with China because of western sanctions. She said that 
“The sanctions push Russia’s government to cooperate more with China. Another reason is US 
competition on gas with Russia. The competition is not on the Chinese market but on the 
European market. The European market is the traditional market of Russia. Therefore, Russia 
had to explore new markets for its gas”.  
She continues this line of thought by saying that “The energy relations between China and 
Russia have not so many relations with Russia’s China’s political relations. From my view, 
only up to Russia was sanctioned by western countries, the China-Russia energy cooperation 
began to improve in recent years. It is very interesting, from the Crimean crisis, the two 
countries’ energy cooperation was making great progress”. 
As a concluding remark; “We should put the Chinese-Russian energy cooperation in the recent 
years on the background of international politics” She then clarified by saying that she meant 
the Crimean crisis, the US shale gas revolution and low international energy prices. 
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Some observers are in the opinion that the move by Beijing is not only done as an act of 
friendliness. Discussing two large-scale gas trade agreements negotiated between Russia and 
China in “the shadow of the Ukraine crisis” Bertelsen and Gallucci (2016: 243) say that “…the 
advantageous terms of the agreement for China suggests the lack of options for Russia and 
therefore bargaining power of China”. According to the authors, this holds truth for the 
agreements between Russian and Chinese companies in the Yamal LNG Project as well. 
In other words, China exploited the weakness of the Russian bargaining position, and secured 
good terms for themselves in negotiations with the Russian side over gas deliveries. This is very 
much in line with the idea of a partnership of convenience, as well as what professor S said 
during our interviews: “The investments will not influence the relations outside of the energy 
sector”. She was negative to the idea that these investments made much difference in the 
cooperation between Russia and China in other sectors. 
On the other side, Overland and Kubayeva (2017) are in the opinion that there is a possibility 
that the relations may develop and solidify over time if the efforts are maintained. Signals of 
the current state of the Sino-Russian relations were given when the Russian Foreign minister 
Quoted in a news article posed by The Diplomat, Sergey Lavrov said that “China-Russia 
relations are in the best period of history” (Shannon Tiezzi, 2018). There is with other words a 
political desire to build and strengthen the relations between the two countries at the present. 
Overland and Kubayeva (2017) raise the question whether this political desire will fade away 
as soon as the current tough economic conditions change once more. 
As a conclusion, I would say that the investments are able to signal to Moscow that China may 
develop into being a source of investment and markets for Russia. At the same time, Sino-
Russian relations have historically been changing rapidly, and both sides remain cautious of the 
other. Energy cooperation between the two countries will, in my opinion, be improved, but 
whether political relations between them will be improved in short to medium term because of 
the investments is rather questionable. Thus, the investments in the Yamal LNG project are 
only to a limited extent considered able to improve the neighbouring relations between China 
and Russia. 
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6.2.2 Counter the US pivot to Asia 
As both Russia and China are facing problems in their relationship with the US, a necessity-
driven partnership between Russia and China appeared to be a logical option. Russia has been 
met with rejection and sanctions over its involvement in Ukraine, and China has recently by the 
US under the Trump administration been met with extraordinary tariffs on their goods sold to 
the US. 
The US has been building and nurturing relations with Asian nations as Japan, Singapore, 
Myanmar, Indonesia South Korea, Thailand, The Philippines and Vietnam. In addition to this, 
The United States has negotiated with Asian countries to create a comprehensive trading 
community named the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Campbell and Andrews, 2013).  
However, Trump appears to have pulled slightly out of some of the Asian policies of Obama 
during his presidency. Trump pulled the US out of the TPP following his inauguration and may 
thus have lost some of the progress the US only years ago appeared to have achieved in 
involving itself in the region (B. Stewart, 2018).  
As presented, the BRI has according to the published policy papers and observers an objective 
to link countries and economies together and to create and strengthen alliances and partnerships. 
Building a stronger relationship with Russia may give Russia an alternative to the partnership 
it had with the European Union and the United States. However, as shown during our 
discussions in the previous chapter, China has not yet offered investments and support capable 
of substituting European and American partnerships. Such an alternative would, however, make 
it possible for Russia to continue current policies in counter to the western interests, and at the 
same time makes it harder for the US to build its footing in the South Asian Region. 
As for the Yamal LNG project, it is interesting to observe its ability to open doors for the 
Chinese last addition to Silk Road routes – The Ice Silk Road. As I concluded in the previous 
chapter, the Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG project serve to some extent the purpose 
of improving relations between China and Russia, especially in the energy sector. The western 
sanctions placed on the Russian energy sector excludes the west from involvement in this sector 
in Russia. They also make Russia seek alternatives and new partners. Chinese involvement and 
to some degree replacement of the West in the Russian energy sector may in the future weaken 
the US and western interests in the Russian energy sector. As professor S said during our 
interviews, China would probably have liked to invest more if it was allowed to. 
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The energy sector is one of the most important sectors of the Russian economy. Thus, a relative 
weakening of the western footing in the Russian energy sector compared to the Chinese could 
be said to be a relative weakening of western interests in Russia compared to Chinese interests. 
Thus, I would argue that the Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG project are fit for 
countering US influence in Russia and countering the US pivot to the strategic areas of 
China.  
6.2.3 Reduce dependency on traditional sea lanes 
The traditional sea-route from the South China Sea, through the Strait of Malacca, past the 
Indian sub-continent, the Horn of Africa, through the Suez Canal and to Europe is heavily 
trafficked, congested and vulnerable. Any disruptions along this stretch may have serious 
consequences for the nations involved. The Chinese realization of its dependence on the 
traditional trade routes and sea lanes has led China to try to find and develop alternatives.  
The Economic Belt will create on-land transport links with the inner regions of China as well 
as all throughout the Eurasian continent to Europe. Thus, these links will alleviate some of the 
dependence on the sea-lanes. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor may also reduce some of 
the dependence on the Strait of Malacca specifically, and the Indian Ocean generally. Thus, this 
is seen as yet another way to protect supply lines. 
Professor S says that “Before this route, China has also created a route by land from Myanmar 
to Chinas’ East – To the Yunnan Province of China”. She explains that China has at least 3-4 
gas routes – both LNG and gas pipeline routes before the Yamal LNG project. Now China has 
more gas diversification to the country. China is also importing shale gas LNG from the United 
States. These are ways to diversify supply. 
The Northern Sea Route poses an opportunity for diversification of trade and supply lines. The 
route goes to the north rather than south, and it thus goes past a completely different set of 
countries on its way to Europe. Thus, this route will in the future harbour the possibility of a 
substantial diversification for China, reducing the dependence on the traditional sea routes. 
During our interview, professor S said that: “From the aspect of the diversity... It is safer to 
diversify a country’s energy access. Not only the type of energy but also the transportation 
route – the source of energy”. This is also a meaning of the Northern Route from the Arctic. 
This statement is also supported by the theories presented earlier on energy security. 
As I have written in a previous chapter, China has also suggested a future Silk Road on Ice 
going along the Northern Sea Route. According to professor L, China was in need to prove the 
68 
success of the Sino-Russian partnership and the Silk Road on Ice. The investments in a big 
project like the Yamal LNG project was thus one way for China to prove the success of the Silk 
road on Ice and the NSR.  
Professor L also said that another wish of China is to increase its understanding of how to make 
use of the NSR. He continues to say that “For China to bring back LNG from Yamal by ship, it 
will have to navigate the NSR. China has tried this many times, and the route is both available 
and safe”. According to the professor, China could save some 15 days of transport and a lot of 
costs. Access to the NSR would also reduce dependency on congested straits controlled by other 
countries. 
This view was also reflected during my interviews with professor S. According to her, these 
investments may be fit to push Chinese industries and companies to improve their technological 
level in long-way transportation. This has strategic implications for China in the sense of 
pushing the limits for how far it can go in the world. 
For China to attain access to Arctic shipping, the Sino-Russian relations will be important for 
China. The investments in the Yamal LNG project may help Russia and China develop a joint 
understanding of the Arctic, and to bring the issue of Arctic shipping to the agenda in a natural 
way. Indirectly by investing, it may also be said that China already has gained some access to 
Arctic shipping and operation, considering that China is a major investor in the Arctic Yamal 
LNG project and a large customer of the LNG therefrom.  
If this economic commitment will achieve the goal of increasing Chinese Arctic legitimacy and 
access is for now unclear. I may, however, conclude that these investments are appropriate to 
help achieve this goal, and thus the Chinese Yamal LNG project investments are in line with 
the geopolitical wish to reduce dependency on the traditional shipping lanes. 
6.3 Economic reasons for investing in Yamal LNG 
6.3.1 Move reserves of foreign currency to more profitable investments 
Discussions about the economic reasons for investing in the Yamal LNG will be the starting 
point of this chapter. As stated in the background information chapter, the Yamal LNG Project 
was by an analyst expected to be breaking even at LNG prices a little higher than today. 
Nevertheless, as reported in the same chapter, it has been expressed by both Total and SRF that 
even though the project is complex, it is highly competitive. All the economic advantages 
discussed in the background information chapter on the economic rationale of the Yamal LNG 
Project work to achieve this competitiveness. A quick summary of these economic advantages 
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would be: large reserves, on-land drilling, Arctic experience, efficient liquification process due 
to low temperatures and support from the Russian government, as for instance in the form of 
mineral extraction tax and VAT exemptions. 
In addition, commercial actors such as Total and Novatek seek economic benefits and profits 
for their shareholders. Investing along with such commercial actors may establish a certain level 
of economic expectations in the investment project. If these economic expectations are not 
expected to be achieved, it will be rather uninteresting for a listed corporation as Total or 
Novatek to prolong the project. 
In this regard, it is highly interesting to once more look at the plans for a second Yamal LNG 
project, namely the Arctic LNG 2. As explained in chapter 4.3 ‘Economic rationale’, Total has 
already bought a 10% stake in the second project. Total therefore shows all intentions to 
continue cooperating on LNG production with Novatek. 
China will also remain an important partner in the Arctic LNG 2. The SRF is expected to be the 
central financial partner, and it is stated that Chinese interest in the project could amount to as 
much as 49,9% (Nilsen, 2018). The article continues to say that CNPC is another potential 
partner for this project as well, and that the final investment decision is expected to be taken 
next year (Nilsen, 2018). This all stands to testify to how happy the partners are with the project, 
and that they would like to continue the cooperation in another major gas project.  
In addition to the listed reasons for the possible profitability of the project, it can be claimed 
that China has had other objectives to gain on the economic side. China and Chinese companies 
and funds have contributed with investments as well as major loans. The loans with which 
China has contributed totals at least 11,75 billion USD. The interest charged on these loans is 
to me unknown, but the interest paid to the Russian lenders is publicly known. The two Russian 
banks Gazprombank and Sberbank granted a loan to Yamal LNG of 3,6 billion EUR, on which 
EURIBOR 6M plus 4,7% annual interest would be charged (Yamal LNG (a), 2016).  
As of September 2015, when the SRF bought their 9,9% stake in the Yamal LNG Project, the 
American treasury 10-year bond interest rate was at 2,128% annually. As of today, the 26th of 
November 2018, this rate has increased to 3,024% annually (Cnbc.com, 2018). A lot of the 
foreign currency reserves of China are placed in such low yielding bonds (Wang, 2016: 457). 
If the lending of 11,75 billion USD is yielding similar interest rates as the loans of Sberbank 
and Gazprombank to Yamal LNG, the increase in the Yield on loans is significant.  
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Another economic reason for China to invest in the Yamal LNG is that it has managed to 
negotiate contracts of construction back to the Chinese mainland. In 2014, the Offshore Oil 
Engineering Co., Ltd. (COOEC) signed its largest ever foreign contract with the Yamal LNG 
Project as a part of the overall deal between the Yamal LNG Project and Chinese companies 
(China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 2017). COOEC is a listed company controlled by 
CNOOC, and has a total of 8000 employees (COOEC, n.d.). The agreement covered 
deliverance of 36 modules important to LNG production. The total value of the agreement was 
in excess of 1,6 billion USD (China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 2017). 
Moving production back to China creates work in China and is thus a part of achieving one of 
the ultimate goals of the Chinese government – economic development. 
Depending on the development of the world LNG prices, the project itself may very well be 
profitable in the future. This was however according to professor L hard to say for certain at 
this time, due to the scale and complexity of the project. 
As lenders of money, the financial institutions contributing with money to the disposal of Yamal 
LNG are in a situation where they will receive their money before the owners. The large 
monetary contributions of Chinese banks to the project may, therefore, prove fruitful. In 
addition to this, with the protection enjoyed by the Yamal LNG project from the Russian 
government as well as the benefits derived therefrom, the project may be claimed to be 
relatively shielded and secure. China has thus apparently managed to move financial 
investments away from low yielding American state bonds over to higher yielding relatively 
secure investments. 
As a conclusion on the economic objectives achieved by China by investing in Yamal LNG, I 
can say that some goals have already been achieved, and others may be achieved in the future. 
Thus, the Yamal LNG Project appears to be fit to serve the goal of placing financial means in 
a more profitable investment vehicle than US treasury bonds. 
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6.3.2 Reduce overcapacity and facilitate the development of inner regions of China 
Internally in China, there are large economic differences. The coastal regions are generally 
more developed and economically important. For China, it is, however, important to develop 
the inner regions as well as the coastal regions. Thus, connecting the inner regions with world 
trade is important. The economic Belt may be instrumental in doing this. 
The pipeline gas delivery agreements between China and Russia cross the Russian border into 
the eastern interior regions of China. These pipelines may, therefore, be logically be connected 
to the trade, economy and development of these regions due to geographic approximation. 
The Yamal LNG project gas shipments do not appear to me to be logically connected with the 
interior regions of China in the same way as gas delivered by pipeline from Russia. The LNG 
shipments will be delivered by tankers via LNG terminals along the coastal areas of China.  
Rather on the contrary, during my interview with professor S, she said that the domestically 
produced coal of China is produced in the interior regions, as for instance Inner Mongolia. 
During our interview, we discussed future flows of energy, and at this point, we discussed the 
possibility for natural gas replacing the demand for coal. If the gas delivered by tankers would 
work to replace the demand for domestically produced coal, employment in the mining sector 
could fall in the interior regions. However, the energy forecasts for China show that the total 
energy demand will increase in the future and that coal consumption will decline rather slowly. 
If the LNG shipments will have significant negative effects on employment and development 
in the interior regions is however hard to say.  
Another point under this economic claim was the need to reduce overcapacity in the Chinese 
economy. Again, it is important to consider the large production agreement between the Yamal 
LNG Project and COOEC, signed in 2014 and completed in 2017. The agreement had as stated 
above a value in excess of 1,6 billion USD (China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 2017). 
The headquarter of COOEC is located in Binhai New District in the coastal city of Tianjin. The 
company has large production facilities in Tianjin Municipality, Qingdao of Shandong Province 
and Zhuhai of Guangdong Province. All three regions are coastal regions. With other words, 
all of the construction is done along the coast, and not in the interior regions. The production is 
thus not helping to develop the interior regions. 
As a conclusion, the Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG project may have adverse or 
neutral effects on the employment and development of the inner regions of China. As we have 
seen before, China will be dependent on maintaining a significant domestic coal production in 
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the future, despite growing imports of gas. The project investments are in my opinion fit for 
reducing overcapacity in the Chinese economy, considering the large production deals secured 
for the Chinese mainland. 
6.3.3 Facilitate the ease of trade 
Connectivity is important for the Chinese economy, both for the sourcing of its input resources 
as well for channelling its goods to world markets. Working long-term for improving relations 
with Russia and investing in the Yamal LNG project may eventually give China access to the 
Northern Sea Route. After all, by investing heavily in the Yamal LNG project, China has 
already to some extent indirectly gained access to Arctic shipping.  
In the Arctic policy of China, the Chinese government outlined its desire to get access to Arctic 
shipping lanes. These shipping lanes may one day be a shorter and less congested alternative to 
the traditional shipping lanes going westwards. This point was stressed by both Professor L and 
Professor S during our interviews. 
Another possibility following the improvement of Sino-Russian relations is that possibilities 
for better market access may open up. This is true for the Russian market directly, but also true 
for the Central Asian countries. These countries have traditionally been regarded as a special 
zone of influence for Russia, but if Russia accepts Chinese involvement in its neighbourhood 
and in its own country, development possibilities of the region itself may present themselves. 
This process is already going on, although at the beginning against the will of Russia. 
Thus, the Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG project may be facilitating the ease of trade 
between the two countries, both by creating physical infrastructure along the trading routes, but 
also by improving the relationship between the two states. 
6.3.4 Develop the technological level of China 
The Arctic Policy of China outlines a clear desire for scientific research in the Arctic (SCIO, 
2018). According to professor L, China has a limited understanding of the Arctic. As observers 
to the Arctic Council and responsible participants of the international community would like to 
help contribute to the common knowledge about the Arctic. To some extent as a joke, he said 
that Chinese people have an unclear understanding of the Arctic, just as Norwegians may have 
a vague understanding of Sanya (An area dubbed the Hawaii of China). As examples, Professor 
L mentions that China would like to understand the progression of climate change, as well as 
how best to exploit the resource base of the Arctic. 
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When China invests, it is according to professor S important for China that the projects include 
some level of technological development. According to the professor, China is not only 
interested in investing money in foreign projects, but also to export Chinese technology or to 
push its companies to develop strategic technologies further.  
The professor says that “If China just invests money, but with no Chinese portion of 
technology... With no Chinese technology... In other words, China has no advantage in 
technology, its investment in money outside has no meaning – it is not sustainable”. 
According to her, the Yamal LNG project is highly interesting in this respect. Long-distance 
transportation in challenging areas is one example of a field in which the investments in the 
Yamal LNG Project may help developing Chinese technologies. 
As discussed in the chapter about “economic sustainability” and “interior development and 
reduction of overcapacity”, the COOEC landed a large production agreement for high-tech 
equipment for the Yamal LNG Project. In the press release offered in the occasion of project 
completion, the CNOOC said that: 
“Through the project, COOEC has successfully mastered the LNG core process module 
construction technology and entered the international high-end oil-gas equipment market. It 
has also made breakthroughs in key technologies, including welding, deep-cooling heat 
preservation, hoisting of huge and irregular equipment, and large-area fireproof paint 
coating” (China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 2017). 
As we can see from this quote, China has gained access to and tested a series of advanced 
technologies and capabilities it did not have from before the project investment. Being involved 
in the project, it has had to produce high end equipment capable of operating in Arctic 
conditions. 
With the interest of the Chinese government to gain access to, and understanding of the Arctic 
area, this opportunity has been remarkable for China. They have produced equipment vital to 
the project, delivered successfully, and it is operating under these Arctic conditions.  
According to professor S, the technological possibilities of the Chinese investments in the 
Yamal LNG Project makes them more interesting in this regard than the Chinese investments 
in energy projects in Africa and South America. Because of this, I will say that the Yamal LNG 
Project investments are fit for developing the technological level of China. 
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7.0 Sino-Russian and Sino-Norwegian relations and consequences for international flows 
of energy 
This chapter will examine the possible consequences for the international flows of energy 
following the Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG Project. It will then examine the 
investment’s possible consequences for the Sino-Russian and Sino-Norwegian relations as well 
as for China’s Arctic ambitions. 
7.1 Consequences for world flow of energy 
According to Professor S, the Northern Sea Route itself can influence energy flows. The Yamal 
LNG project will increase the gas volume (supply) on the gas markets, as well as it increases 
the routes to energy markets. By investing in the Yamal LNG project and purchasing a 
contracted annual amount of LNG from the project, China may increase its sourcing of gas and 
reduce its relative dependence on other sources. 
The professor says that: “it will also change other flows. If China imports more LNG from the 
Arctic, perhaps it will reduce... If the Chinese demand is stable – Not increasing. If China 
imports more from Yamal LNG, it will reduce its import from other areas. Maybe China could 
reduce its domestic gas production. This is a consequence of volume. If a new field is explored, 
it will change the energy flows”.  
As an example of such a change in flows, the professor said that “China could reduce its 
imports from Australia, which means that Australia may have to try to increase its exports to 
Japan or South Korea. It will mean a change of the flow”. 
Following a similar logic, Russia would also be able to diversify its customer base. As discussed 
earlier in the thesis, Russia is currently facing competition and turbulence on the traditional 
European market. With the new contracts on pipeline gas deliverance to China, as well as LNG 
from the Arctic, new markets are being opened up for Russia in the east. 
For Norway, a change in energy flows may be felt as well. Norway is located on the European 
side of a long Trans-Arctic Shipping route. This route will especially during the winter months 
be an important transport line for Russian Arctic LNG on its way to world markets. Increased 
long-distance energy transport along the long coast of Norway may require the country to for 
instance increase emergency response capabilities or build additional ports. Another 
consequence for Norway deriving from additional LNG coming from the Arctic may be 
increased competition in the LNG markets already being served by Norwegian LNG, even if 
the volumes are low. On this notion, it is, however, important to keep in mind the fact that most 
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of the LNG from the Yamal LNG Project is contracted on long-term delivery contracts to 
mostly Asian markets. 
China has a policy goal of increasing the share of natural gas in the energy mix and decreasing 
consumption of coal. Chinese coal could thus be replaced by imported gas, and coal production 
in inland China could be relatively less important. This would according to the conclusion of 
the interview with professor S mean that China would increase its dependence on external 
partners while reducing domestic production of coal. 
7.2 Sino-Russian relations 
According to Bennett (2016), the Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG Project may very 
well signify a change of Chinese investment policy in Russia. The author claims that previous 
Chinese business dealings with Russia were oriented towards viewing Russia as an energy 
supplier, and not a country for energy investments. According to the professor, the Yamal LNG 
Project is the first Russian energy project China has invested in, and the investments thus 
remind the observer about the Chinese investments in Central Asia, rather than previous 
business with Russia. 
In the view of Bennett (2016), China is eyeing the possibility for other projects than only the 
Yamal LNG Project and the Moscow-Kazan railway. Concrete projects include two 
international transport corridors in Primorskiy Krai and a project connecting the city of Yakutsk 
with the national on-land rail or road system. This bears resemblance to the notions of Professor 
S who said, as we mentioned previously under affordability, that China would have liked to 
invest even more into the Russian energy sector, if it was allowed to. Comparing these two 
perspectives, both the transport infrastructure sector and the energy sector look attractive for 
Chinese investments. 
These points are important seen in the light provided by the concluding remarks of Bennett 
(2016). Here she says that it has been a problem between China and Russia to finish large scale 
projects on the border between the two countries. Russia has a tendency to announce large scale 
projects, but not to finish them on schedule.  
One exemplifying project mentioned in particular was the agreed construction of a bridge across 
the Amur river on the Chinese-Russian border. The Chinese side of the bridge was finished in 
July 2016 but is currently dangling in the air with no connection on the Russian side (Bennett 
2016). This is seen as a real problem for investments between China and Russia according to 
Bennett (2016). In the same article, it was mentioned that a successful completion of the 
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Moscow-Kazan Railway may be necessary for further Chinese investments in Russian transport 
industry.  
Professor L also had something to say about this. He said early on that the Chinese investments 
in the Yamal LNG Project were about proving the Sino-Russian partnership. A successful 
completion of such large-scale projects as both the high-speed railway linking Moscow and 
Kazan, as well as the Yamal LNG Project, may thus show an ability to operate successfully 
together as partners. 
Another point is that Russia has a policy of pivoting to the east. The pivot was announced right 
before the time of the ongoing conflict between Russia, Ukraine and the West (Lo and Hill, 
2013). A successful project completion able to prove the Sino-Russian partnership may work 
to encourage Russia to continue strengthening its partnership with China.  
China has a desire to access the shipping lanes of the Northern Sea Route. According to the 
Arctic Policy of China, the Arctic shipping routes could become important for transportation of 
goods in the future. China therefore says that it “encourages its enterprises to participate in the 
infrastructure construction for these routes and conduct commercial trial voyages in 
accordance with the law to pave the way for their commercial and regularized operation” 
(SCIO, 2018: Part 3.1) 
As we have seen before, Russia has been rather “…disinclined to treat China as an equal in the 
Arctic” (Flake 2013: 682). Development of the relations between China and Russia following 
joint successful Arctic project developments and deepening strategic partnership, may help on 
this situation sometime in the future. China, by investing in the Yamal LNG Project and 
purchasing LNG from the project may at least indirectly already have gained access to arctic 
shipping. 
As we saw from the Arctic Policy of China, China is encouraging its companies to help develop 
the infrastructure in the region. Combined with the Russian desire to develop strategic 
infrastructure, there may be both leverage and interest between China and Russia to cooperate 
more in the Arctic in the future. 
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7.3 Sino-Norwegian relations 
As explained in the background information chapter on the Sino-Norwegian relations, China 
and Norway have gone through a period of diplomatic troubles. These troubles seem to be over 
by this time, and the relations are warming up. As of today (16.10.2018), the Norwegian King 
and Queen are on an official state visit to China. Along with them are hundreds of 
representatives from Norwegian business and diplomacy, and a large number of agreements 
have been signed (Aass Kristiansen, Langsem and Gimse, 2018). In fact, a free trade agreement 
between China and Norway is expected signed as soon as during 2019 (Mo, 2018). 
As for how the Chinese investments in the Yamal LNG Project may influence the Sino-
Norwegian relations, Professor L had some interesting remarks. In his opinion, the possible 
consequences could be very positive. He said that “It will be a good example of cooperation 
between China and other Arctic countries. We should learn from this project, so we can 
cooperate according to this model”. He continues by saying “I think the Yamal LNG project 
will cause a positive influence for all the Arctic countries. To find a chance to cooperate”. 
The Yamal LNG project investments could, therefore, represent a model for future economic 
cooperation between Arctic states and China in the future, according to Professor L. A 
successful major project could prove that China is a reliable partner, not just to Russia, but also 
to others.  
“For China is highly attentive to its relations to northern European countries. Because Belt and 
Road initiative has the main purpose of connecting China with Europe. So of course, all 
European countries, especially arctic countries are in the European economic community”. 
From his statement, we can see that China cares for its relations with Norway and the Nordic 
countries. Because of their participation in the European economic community, their location 
in the Arctic and their potential for project development, future relations with the northern 
European Countries would be interesting to China. 
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8.0 Concluding remarks 
The Yamal LNG project investments may help China achieve a wide range of objectives. Which 
factors are the most important for the Chinese government in deciding on such a project? 
In estimating the importance of the various drivers, professor L has some interesting remarks. 
On a question about the prospects for profitability, he says that: “This is a big project. It is very 
hard to calculate profitability. The project is primarily politically motivated. Strategic 
partnership with Russia. Secondly, China really needs energy”. Professor L is in the opinion 
that helping Russia through tough times and confirming the strategic partnership tough times is 
the most important drivers behind the investments in the project. Secondly for the professor is 
to satisfy the energy needs of China, and to strengthen its energy security. Economical questions 
as profitability are thus placed third in the ranking of relative importance to the Chinese 
government.  
The professor continues his line of thought by saying that: “CNPC and the SRF are not private. 
They are state-owned entities and are controlled by the government of China. State-owned 
corporations need to obey the instructions from the government. On the other hand, they also 
need to make a profit, because they are companies – corporations. For a short time period, we 
cannot say profitable or not. For a long time period, I think there will be a profit”. Thus, the 
professor is not in the opinion that the government has made the investment primarily on behalf 
of political considerations, but that the Chinese still have placed their investments in an 
economically promising project. He says that “Most important is the political driver plus we 
need natural gas. from this perspective, we can’t evaluate the project only from economic 
drivers”. 
From my interviews with Professor S, the much the same argument was presented. As stated 
above, Professor S said that in her opinion, affordability of the project or the gas purchased was 
not a top priority of the Chinese government. Professor S thought that availability, reliability 
and sustainability of energy supply were the most important to the Chinese government. The 
reason that she gave for listing these dimensions of energy security so high was that the 
legitimacy of the Chinese government is based on economic growth and social and political 
stability. These three factors supporting the legitimacy of the Chinese government are then 
inextricably supported directly by the consumption of energy, and a sufficient level of energy 
security. Economic growth, societal and political stability deriving from energy security thus 
seem to be more prioritized higher than economic considerations of the project investments and 
energy cost. 
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Comparing the views of Professor L and Professor S, there seems to be a difference in the 
investments’ ability to improve the relationship with Russia, and also the relative importance 
of improving relations with Russia to the Chinese government. They are however both agreeing 
that economic considerations are of lesser importance, at the same time as a higher political 
objective is driving the investment decisions. 
The Yamal LNG project appears to be a strategic fit with most of the strategic Chinese 
objectives identified in chapter 6.0 and summarized in table 6.1.  
As a summary, the investments in the Yamal LNG project will be expected to answer energy 
security concerns of China by improving availability, strengthening reliability, bettering the 
affordability and increasing the level of sustainability of the Chinese energy supply.  
In addition, the geopolitical consequences of the Yamal LNG project investments are likely to 
be positive for China. The project will strengthen the strategic partnership between Russia and 
China and will make it harder for the US to pressure Russia and thus get a firmer influence in 
the region. The project may at some point in the future contribute for China to opening up new 
transport lanes along the Northern Sea Route. 
On the economic side, the investments may prove to be profitable for China, both as a capital 
owner and as an investor. In addition, it is likely that if the investments will help China gain 
access to the NSR in the future, China may potentially save significant amounts of money on 
the transport of goods to world markets. In addition, economic cooperation may lead to a better 
access to the Russian market. 
As for the relative importance of the Chinese investment drivers behind the initiative, I have 
concluded that political motivations were assumed to be prioritized higher by the Chinese 
government than considerations of project profitability and energy affordability. As an 
example, in order to increase the sustainability of the energy supply, China was willing to 
import foreign natural gas instead of producing coal domestically at full capacity.  
The drivers for investment highlighted as most important by my sources were the desire to 
prove the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and the viability of the NSR, as well as improving 
the energy security of China. Profitability and affordability were, however, not insignificant, as 
both of these concepts seem to be preserved by the project. 
Development of such a large energy project as the Yamal LNG project may also hold the 
potential for dramatically altering international energy flows, as discussed above.  
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Chinas’ increasing role in the Arctic and investment in a major Arctic energy project marks the 
entering of another major player in Arctic affairs and politics. It was suggested in the later parts 
of the discussion that a successful Arctic project with China as an important investor may prove 
to other Arctic states that China may be a good partner in the Arctic. It will be interesting to see 
in the future if the Chinese way of doing business will be embraced in the future by other Arctic 
states.  
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Appendix 
A.1 Interview guide 
These questions are aimed at creating a red thread throughout our interview. The hope is 
however to create a flowing conversation around these topics. The interviews are meant to give 
insight to the assignment. In addition to the data from the interviews conducted, I will use 
reports, papers and speeches to enlighten the problem. 
In the beginning of the conversation I will make sure that we both agree on the treatment of the 
data. Full confidentiality if desired. In addition, I will ask for the permission to record. 
I will then proceed to give the interviewee an understanding of my project. 
The project is about the role energy concerns play in the Chinese decision to participate in the 
Yamal LNG project. I will look at the various drivers behind the project, and try to identify 
their importance and level of achievement through the investment. Energy security 
(Availability, affordability, reliability and sustainability of energy supplies), Geopolitical 
drivers and economic drivers. 
My project also tries to capture the bigger picture behind these investments, and how the project 
may influence the relations between for instance Norway/China and Russia/China. How may 
this project and development and testing of the Northern Sea route influence the global energy 
flows? The second part of the project is however not supposed to be the main focus of my 
assignment. 
* What does energy security mean for China? 
* What is the most serious threat to energy security in peace time? 
o Availability 
o Affordability 
o Reliability 
o Sustainability 
* What are the most serious threats to energy security in times of conflict? 
* Does the Yamal LNG project do anything to improve energy security for China? In which 
ways would you say? 
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* What are in your opinion the objectives to be achieved for China when investing in the Yamal 
LNG project? 
* How may the investment influence the Sino-Russian relations? 
* How may the investment influence the Sino-Norwegian relations? 
* What does this investment have to say for the world energy flows? 
* What could the Yamal LNG investments have to say for the Chinese interests in the Arctic? 
* Do you have anything interesting to add, or something that we have not covered in our 
conversation? 
A.2 Content condensed interview with Professor L 
In 2014 both China and Russia both parties decided to push the strategic partnership into a new 
stage. The Yamal project is a concrete project to testify – To prove China-Russia strategic 
partnership. 
This point is very clear. 
When the west imposed sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and Crimea, Russia needed help from 
China. Financial support and new markets for Russia’s energy. 
China needs clean energy – Russian gas. China wants to change the fuel from Coal to natural 
gas. Xi Jinping is highly attentional to the environment. Less coal and more natural gas. Coal 
is the main reason for emissions. 
In the north of China, it is very cold. Domestic use of coal is highly polluting as well. 
Silk Road on the Ice. How to prove the success of the Silk Road on the Ice? This is one way. 
Profitability: 
This is a big project. It is very hard to calculate the profitability. The project is primarily 
politically motivated. Strategic partnership with Russia. Secondly, China really needs energy. 
Energy security is therefore in second place. 
All Yamal LNG gas has already been sold by contract. More than 50% will go to the Asian 
Market, and more than half of that will go to China. 
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CNPC and the SRF are not private. They are state owned entities, and are controlled by the 
government of China. State owned corporations need to obey the government. However, for a 
long period, I think they will achieve profit. Political plus economical private. 
This is a big project and may create a lot of benefits for Chinese companies. 
Explore the North East route. This may save a lot of costs. 
In this way it is possible to avoid straits controlled by the US. In this perspective, energy security 
is thought about. China is facing such a problem already. 
China is in a situation where it can solve problems very easily. If the central government makes 
a decision, the local governments need to enact the decision. To obey. 
The BRI main reason, it is argued in Russia, is to source energy. China needs energy from 
Russia and central Asian countries. SCO.  
The relations between China and Russia are very positive. But there is a level of mistrust. There 
are historic reasons. Cold war  1949-1959 good, then 1959-1969 quarrel and border fight, 
then 1979 reconciliation, 1989 normalization (Gorbetsjev). Russia took 1 million km2 from 
China. 
Relations improved very fast, but still some distrust. The problem is just below the surface. 
Some argue it is an alliance, others do not. There is a strategic cooperation with prospects, but 
it is made harder by distrust. 
The leaders of the two countries trust each other. After 1991, the former Chinese president had 
personal experience of studying in Russia, and he felt it was sad that the SSSR fell.  
The Yamal project is a good project to improve relations with Russia and improve 
economically. 
The main reason for Chinese interest is scientific research. Chinese do not understand the 
Arctic, and they want to understand the region. Secondly, make use of the Arctic resources. 
China needs energy and resources to improve living standards. 
China is thankful for the help it received from Norway in accessing the Arctic Council. As a 
member of the Arctic Council China feels that it needs to do some contribution to the Arctic. 
It is easy to fall back into cold war thinking with geopolitics and strategies. China is very clear. 
It is not an Arctic country, just a country close to the Arctic. A member of the Arctic Council. 
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The five countries close to the Arctic should dominate the Arctic Council. But members of the 
Council should be involved, but they can not dominate. Just be involved within the frames of 
international law, and domestic law.  
Consequences for Norway: No direct influence for other Arctic countries. This is just an 
economical project. The other ambitions.. It will be a good example for cooperation between 
China and other countries. We should learn from this project, so we can also cooperate 
according to this model. 
China is highly attentive on its relations with countries as Norway, Sweden, Denmark. Because, 
the BRI main purpose is to connect Asia with Europe. So of course, European and especially 
Arctic countries are in the European Economic Community. Connect European and Asian 
countries. 
It can create a possibility for the Arctic countries. Not only to export fish to China. 
A.3 Content condensed interview with Professor S 
Introduction: Explaining the Yamal LNG project and its ownership structure. 
The interviewee found it interesting that there would be two routes from the Yamal LNG project 
to the Asian markets. 
What does energy security mean for China? 
The first implication is both domestic and international stability. Domestic stability is economic 
growth the other is political stability. Economic growth has many unicque implications for the 
political communist party – the economic growth of China. Economic growth relies on 
sufficient energy supply. 
Fossil energy makes a total of more than 60% of Chinese energy. 
Sustainability in energy security is not only related to the sustainability of energy supply, but 
also to the consequences of energy consumption. Sustainability of the environment. Air 
pollution. Energy sensitive. Coal and oil are not as good as gas – LNG and natural gas. 
Natural gas has more security implications than other fossil fuels of China – Not only economic 
growth, but also many other aspects for China – Including China’s reputation on the 
international stage. International energy forum – Climate change. Wish to cooperate. Yamal 
LNG has more energy security implications than coal and oil. 
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Legitimacy of the Chinese government is linked with economic growth, political stability, and 
societal stability. 
Reliability – If we just rely on the spot market for our energy, it is not reliable. The gas market 
is different than the gas market. Gas is traded by contract. Oil market is more volatile. 
The gas market is more reliable. This is another implication for the energy security. 
Affordability is not a top priority for Chinese concern. Availability and reliability is the most 
important for the Chinese. 
If the gas can come from the Arctic by contracts of 20 years, it would be very available. Most 
of the cooperation between China and Russia is done by contract style. It is different than just 
spot purchses. Affordability for both the project and the energy they are buying. 
Contract on the projects and on price. 
If China was allowed to, it would invest more than it is currently allowed to LNG from the 
harsh Arctic environment to China. It is a challenge to Chinese shipping technology. This 
investment can push its industries to improve its long-way transportation. This has strategic 
implications for China in pushing the limits for how far it can go. 
This leads to the technological implications if the BRI. The Chinese government doesn’t only 
want to invest money outside of China, but also to invest technology to the outside world. This 
way, it is not just economical, but also a wish to improve its technological development. 
From the Chinese point of view, exporting investments in projects without exporting and 
developing technologies is not considered to be sustainable. Just to invest money. If China has 
no advantages in technology, its investments are not sustainable and they have no meaning. 
The level of technology is also improved in the area of long-distance transportation. The 
interviewee thinks the Yamal LNG projects have more implications than Chinese energy 
investments in Africa. For 30 years, China has invested in South America and Africa. For 
instance in Angola and in the Kongo. Those investments in Africa have now profits or low 
income for Chinese energy supply. China has to cooperate with middle eastern countries for 
energy access. But the geopolitical situation is not very stable in the ME. For instance Trump 
quit the Iran nuclear agreement. Russia is now a bigger exporter to China. Angola and Iran also 
used to be huge countries for energy deliverance. 
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China has a principle of not engaging in domestic political issues. This is a way to enable 
balanced diplomatic work with all parties in for instance the middle east. China has also created 
a mutual dependence with Middle-Eastern countries. China imports oil from them, and they 
import Chinese products. Economic interdependence. China has no colonial legacy, so it 
doesn’t have a negative reputation. However, the instability is worrisome. 
Australia is a LNG provider to China. The Sino-Australian relations are not that good anymore. 
Australia and the United States also have a strong military cooperation, and the Chinese 
government is suspicious towards Australia. Australia is however still a large LNG supplier to 
China.  
US control over the Malacca Strait is the under-the-table concern of China. China can now take 
the free-ride of the strait security. But the control is in the hand of another country, so it is not 
a comfortable situation for China. China is a big country, and it is not safe if its security is 
supplied by another country. This is why China is expanding its Blue Sea capabilities. 
This is why it is smart and safe to diversify not only the energy type, but also the route of 
transportation. 
China has also diversified deliverance across land from Myanmar to Yunnan province. China 
also has pipelines from Russia. Before this, China only had one route for gas to China. 
China also imports shale gas LNG. It makes the Chinese gas import more diversified. The trade 
in LNG between the US and China will not make much impact on the international relations 
between China and the US. Trading and economic relations are two different things. 
Energy relations between China and Russia have not so much in relation to the political 
relations. In my view, only after the Russian sanctions, the Chinese Russian energy cooperation 
had to be improved. From the Georgia crisis and the Crimea crisis, the two countries made great 
progress. 
The influence of energy cooperation is very limited to other areas. It is influencing only energy 
itself. Energy relations is influenced more by international politics. Because of the sanctions by 
western countries, Russia had to cooperate with China on energy. Russia wants more money 
from the Chinese side. There are few investments from western countries and less market.  
She this that Russia has to approach China more than that Russia wants to approach China. 
Because of the sanctions, the Russian government is pushed to cooperate with the Chinese 
government. There is also a competition between the US and Russian gas market, and Russia 
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needs to explore new markets. The sino-Russian relations should be viewed on the background 
of international politics. The Crimean crisis the international background, the other is energy 
politics. The third one is low oil price in the world. The oil price can influence the gas prices. 
The low oil price has stopped in 2018, but for the last years Russia has really suffered from low 
oil prices.  
It will cost a lot for the EU to diversify its gas supply, but it will be safer for it to do this in the 
long term. Eastern European countries are more suspicious towards Russia than Western 
European countries. China is a Russian point of access to the rest of the far-eastern market. 
Russia needs to cooperate with China to access the Asian markets. China holds this key. 
The transportation routes are showing energy flows. This project increases the volume in the 
market and increases the transportation routes to new markets. It will also change other access 
– For example, if China imports more gas from the Arctic (and the demand is kept at a stable 
level), it will reduce the imports from other areas, or at least China reduces its domestic gas 
production. It is a consequence of the flow domestically and internationally. China could for 
instance reduce its imports from Australia, and then Australia would have to find new markets 
like Japan and Korea. 
Chinese coal comes from the northern and interior regions of China. China will reduce its coal 
consumption and increase its gas reliance. 
In the future, coal will go down, gas will go up and economic development will continue partly 
supported by renewables. 
